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ABSTRACT 
 
ALIXANDRA B. YANUS: Neither Force Nor Will: A Theory of Judicial Power 
(Under the direction of Georg Vanberg) 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to shed greater light on the scope of judicial power and the 
role of the courts in the American political system.  It seeks to expand our understanding of 
the influence of courts beyond the almost exclusive focus on the aftermath of particular 
decisions—central to debates about enforcement powers (or the lack thereof)—to a broader 
understanding of more sophisticated ways in which the judiciary shapes the exercise of 
political power. I argue that the interactions between the courts and these agents have 
significant effects on public policy, both within the judiciary and in the broader political 
system. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
NEITHER FORCE NOR WILL
 
Questions about the scope of judicial power in the American political system are as 
old as the United States itself.  Writing in Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that 
the Supreme Court’s inability to enforce or implement its decisions—the idea that the Court 
had neither the purse nor the sword—made the judiciary the “least dangerous branch.”  Later, 
on the heels of the Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), President Andrew 
Jackson is reported to have again pointed to this relative lack of power, declaring, “[Chief 
Justice] John Marshall has made his decision.  Now let him enforce it.” 
But, much has changed since 1832, including the judiciary’s visible role in many 
twentieth century social movements.  This role has spawned volumes of judicial politics 
scholarship documenting the courts as agents of social change (e.g. Vose 1957, 1959, 1972, 
O’Connor 1980).  These studies have demonstrated that, at least in some conditions, the 
involvement of the judiciary can be a significant impetus to altering public policy, changing 
grassroots opinion, and inspiring political change. 
This dissertation seeks to shed greater light on the scope of judicial power and the 
role of the courts in the American political system.  It seeks to expand our understanding of 
the influence of courts beyond the almost exclusive focus on the aftermath of particular 
decisions—central to debates about enforcement powers (or the lack thereof)—to a broader 
understanding of more sophisticated ways in which the judiciary shapes the exercise of 
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political power. I argue that the interactions between the courts and these agents have 
significant effects on public policy, both within the judiciary and in the broader political 
system. 
The Evolution and Institutionalization of Judicial Power 
The judicial branch occupies a unique role in the American political system.  As 
Hamilton noted, the courts have neither the purse nor the sword.  They can neither make laws 
nor command power in the appropriations process; these powers are given to Congress under 
the U.S. Constitution of 1787.   The judiciary also lacks the power to implement or enforce 
legislation; these tasks fall to the president and the executive branch. 
In fact, the Framers are said to have regarded the judiciary as little but a strategic 
necessity within the new political system.  As a result, little thought was given to this third 
branch of government, and few specifics about the judiciary are enumerated in Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution.    The document creates a Supreme Court and grants Congress the 
power to establish inferior courts as it sees fit.  It establishes the original and appellate 
jurisdiction of the high court, but says little about how the inferior courts should be structured 
or what types of cases they should consider.  
The Constitution also states that justices should be given lifetime terms with good 
behavior.   But, even this provision was added with deference to the fact that the federal 
judiciary would have limited power.  Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 78 that without the 
guarantee of a lifetime term, it would be unlikely that the most qualified legal minds would 
be interested in serving their country in this capacity.  And, as experiences in the early 
republic demonstrated, even with the guarantee of lifetime tenure, few statesmen wanted the 
“honor” of serving on the Supreme Court.    The Court’s first chief justice, John Jay, refused 
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to reassume the post after serving as governor of New York.  One associate justice also 
resigned so that he could serve as chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court. 
The Court was so insignificant in the early days of the republic that the planners of 
the new capital city, Washington, D.C., failed to include a home for the Supreme Court in 
their sketches of the new city.  When this mistake was discovered, the Court was given a 
room in the basement of the U.S. Capitol building.  By all accounts, it was a crowded, dark, 
dismal place.  
The Court remained largely invisible and insignificant in the new republic until the 
appointment of Chief Justice John Marshall in 1801.  Chief Justice Marshall took a number 
of steps to establish the judiciary as a more equal (although still quite inferior) branch in the 
American political system.  Among these were claiming for the Court the power of judicial 
review of the constitutionality of federal laws in Marbury v. Madison (1803) and state laws 
in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816).  The Court also asserted its power in adjudicating 
provisions of the Constitution, including the necessary and proper clause and the commerce 
clause, in cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 
Despite the victories achieved during the more than thirty-year tenure of Chief Justice 
Marshall, the Court remained a “lesser” branch of the U.S. political system when he died in 
office in 1835.  The Court’s power continued to grow gradually over the next 100 years, with 
a major victory achieved in 1929, when Congress authorized the construction of a building 
built exclusively for the Court.  This building, which the Court first occupied in 1935, 
continues to be its home today. 
The Court also has become institutionalized in a number of other ways over the last 
150 years.  Judges today come to the Court with much more judicial experience than in years 
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past.  The Court’s budget today is substantially higher today than in earlier years, allowing 
the justices to hire more law clerks (and write longer opinions with a larger number of 
footnotes).   The evolution of the writ of certiorari has allowed the Court to gain greater 
control over its docket.  And, the justices no longer have to spend endless days and hours 
“riding the circuit” on horseback (McGuire 2004). 
 Perhaps because of these changes, the Court’s role as policymaker has also become 
increasingly obvious, especially in the last fifty years.  The Court under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren made this power particularly visible, handing down decisions on a variety of civil 
and political issues that had previously been outside the purview of the American judiciary.  
In addition to the Court’s civil rights rulings in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954), the Court also expanded its power in dealing with issues that had traditionally been 
considered “political questions” and broadened the range of issues appearing on its docket. 
 These policymaking powers have remained visible during the tenures of Warren’s 
successors, Chief Justices Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and John Roberts.  Issues such 
as abortion, gay rights, employment discrimination, and environmental protection—just to 
name a few—have occupied a significant proportion of the Court’s docket.  These cases have 
generated rulings that affect broad cross-sections of Americans and attract vast attention from 
the media and interest groups, to say nothing of Congress and the presidency.   
The Rehnquist Court, in particular, was more eager than any previous Court to not 
only apply, but utilize the power of judicial review.  For example, from 1787 to 1987, the 
Supreme Court struck down 127 federal laws for an average of less than one law per term.  
However, the Rehnquist Court (1987-2005) invalidated 33 statutes, for an average of nearly 
two laws per term (Miller 2004).  That Court also took the unprecedented step of ruling in 
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two cases that essentially decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election; both dealt 
with issues that could have easily been considered “political questions” outside the purview 
of the Court’s traditional responsibilities. 
The Court as Policy Maker 
 The Court’s role as policymaker, however, has not been met with entirely open arms.  
Some legal scholars, most notably Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (1998), charge that 
the Court has overstepped its boundaries in interpreting the law far beyond what is explicitly 
stated in the Constitution.  These scholars contend that the courts should only answer those 
questions explicitly posed to them, and should not attempt to make or decree policies in their 
decisions.   
So, for example, these critics charge that, while the Court should be able to rule on 
the constitutionality of a piece of state or federal legislation, the Court should not be able to 
prescribe a precise remedy or new course of policy.  To use the Court’s decision in the 
abortion case of Roe v. Wade (1973) as an illustration, according to many critics, the Court 
rightly had the power to rule on the constitutionality of the Texas statute, but its decision 
should have been based only on the powers and provisions explicitly stated in the 
constitution.  The Court should not have been able to use so-called penumbras to create a 
right to privacy or lay out a specific trimester approach for other policymakers to follow as 
they implemented new regulations on abortion procedures.1 
 Other observers of the political process have charged that it matters little how broad 
the Court’s decisions are, in large part because the Court cannot truly create wholesale policy 
change.  The most notable (or, perhaps, notorious) work written from this viewpoint 
                                                
1 There are, of course, two separate, but related issues raised by a decision such as the one in Roe. One is 
whether the court should specify a remedy or policy to be adopted. The other is what the court can use as a basis 
for reaching its decisions. 
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continues to be Rosenberg’s (1991) seminal work, The Hollow Hope.  In this analysis, 
Rosenberg uses case studies of several policy issues, including civil rights, women’s rights, 
and abortion to show that judicial decisions alone cannot alter the course of public policy.  
Rosenberg provides evidence that even in issue areas where the U.S. Supreme Court made a 
landmark decision, significant policy change occurred only after Congress and the executive 
branch began to focus on these issues.  In short, Rosenberg argues that because the judiciary 
lacks the power to ensure compliance with its decisions, courts are a “hollow hope” for those 
individuals who seek to achieve policy change. 
 More recent studies of compliance with judicial decisions in other policy areas 
provide an equally dismal impression of the judiciary’s ability to make public policy.  A 
number of studies, most recently by McGuire (2009), demonstrate that despite the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s repeated prohibitions on prayer in public schools, students continue to 
participate in religious activities in secondary education institutions.  This is especially true 
in the South, in rural communities, and in areas with large conservative Christian 
populations. 
 Findings such as these about implementation and compliance illuminate an important 
truth about judicial power.  But, in some ways, they also tempt scholars to give the courts 
short shrift as actors in the policymaking process.  In this dissertation, I argue that even if the 
courts cannot immediately—or even eventually—assure compliance with their decisions, by 
simply making a decision, judges and justices can act as important agenda setters, altering the 
issue attention and lobbying activity of other actors within the political system.  These 
changes have a waterfall effect within the governmental process, and lead to both 
instantaneous and gradual change in public policy.   
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 The judiciary’s agenda and decisions, for example, affect the actions of the legislative 
and executive branches by altering their policy priorities and providing incentives to consider 
the possibility of judicial review.  A vast body of research has considered specific examples 
of this relationship (e.g. Ferejohn and Shipan 1990, Gely and Spiller 1990), as well as the 
informational and political constraints that affect the environment in which these actors 
function (Vanberg 2001, Rogers 2001).   
But, we know less about how the judiciary’s influence extends beyond the judicial 
review process and the formal institutions of government.  By accepting petitions for 
certiorari, hearing oral arguments, and issuing decisions, the judiciary can cause political 
actors to pay more attention to old issues or shift attention to new ones.  This dissertation 
considers how judicial decisions affect the actions of two particularly important quasi-
institutional policy actors: the media, which informs the public about political events, and 
interest groups, who use the courts as an additional venue to mobilize citizens and achieve 
social and political change.  This is particularly true in cases where the courts act as policy 
venues. 
Courts as Policy Venues: Constitutional v. Statutory Law 
Policy venues are the particular institution(s) with the authority to make decisions 
over an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  Changes in policy venues may happen over 
time, and occur as a result of history, constitutional arrangements, or cultural norms.  But, 
once an issue becomes associated with a policy venue, that institution has significant power 
to shape how the issue is framed and alter popular understandings of the issue. 
Previous research largely examines how the elected branches function as policy 
venues. However, the judiciary may also have ownership of some political issues.  In fact, 
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because of the large number of courts and wide range of issues handled by the American 
judiciary, the courts’ power to influence the agendas of other political actors may be quite 
varied and significant.  
The Effects of Institutional Rules 
Most lower courts in the American judicial system (trial courts and intermediate 
appellate courts in state court systems, district and courts of appeals in the federal system) 
have mandatory jurisdiction and are forced to rule on the full range of issues that comes 
before them.  This mandatory jurisdiction compels these courts to consider issues in a way 
that is very different than the legislative and executive branches.  The mandatory nature of 
this jurisdiction may be particularly attractive for disadvantaged groups seeking to achieve 
policy change (Cortner 1968).  While the other branches can effectively ignore groups with 
less political clout, the lower courts, especially, enjoy no such luxury.  Thus, interest groups 
representing the politically disadvantaged often use interest group litigation to achieve policy 
change. 
The federal and state supreme courts’ largely discretionary jurisdiction presents a 
different agenda-setting dynamic.  But, this dynamic is no less significant.  First, by deciding 
which cases to hear in a given year, courts make a powerful statement about the issues that 
they consider to be worthy of a place on the agenda; this power is especially significant 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, which is asked to hear nearly 10,000 cases every year and 
rules on less than 100 cases.  The types of cases that the Court chooses to hear and the rulings 
the justices make on those cases can have a powerful legacy and transform the political 
landscape in part because of the significance of simply being selected out of the pile of 
possible cases.  A pattern of choosing cases in a particular issue area asserts the Court’s 
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agenda-setting power even more clearly.   The Warren Court, for example, was able to bring 
attention to civil rights issues, and the Rehnquist Court gave increased visibility to questions 
of federalism. 
Constitutional v. Statutory Issues 
The courts may act as policy venues when there is great controversy between the 
other branches. They may also become involved in policymaking on issues where the public 
is pushing for a clear policy position, but it is making no progress in the elected branches.  
One of the more enduring distinctions in the policy issues handled by the government, 
however, is the distinction between constitutional and statutory cases. Although common 
wisdom on this distinction has been criticized in recent years (Friedman and Harvey 2003, 
Martin 2006), a body of research demonstrates that the institutional dynamics within the 
judiciary are quite different in these two types of cases.  
Institutional constraints on judicial power, for example, are much lower in 
constitutional than statutory cases (Epstein and Knight 1998). There is little that the elected 
branches can do to change the course of constitutional policy that cannot be reviewed by the 
courts.  The legislature can alter the courts’ jurisdiction and impeach judges.  The legislative 
and executive branches are also able to limit the budget of the judiciary and amend the 
Constitution.    
These executive and legislative powers, however, are rarely utilized.  They are high 
cost propositions that may have limited rewards; even the most far-reaching of these tools, 
Congress’ power to amend the U.S. Constitution, has only been used 17 times since 1800.   
Furthermore, even though these threats may compel the judiciary to pay greater attention to 
the preferences of Congress and the executive branch in some issue areas, they do not change 
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the final reality that the judiciary has—and often uses—broad latitude in making decisions 
regarding constitutional issues. 
Perhaps for these reasons, judges appear to make decisions differently in 
constitutional and statutory cases (e.g. Stock 1990, Spiller and Gely 1992, Pacelle et al. 
2007).  In constitutional cases, for example, the Supreme Court pays comparatively little 
attention to the ideology of Congress, the preferences of the president, and precedent.  In 
contrast, in statutory cases, these factors have a significant impact on judicial decisions 
(Pacelle et al. 2008).  This is likely because the executive and legislative branches have 
greater institutional power to alter judicial decisions on statutory issues.  The congressional 
majority needed to change a statute, for example, is much smaller than the supermajority 
required to amend the constitution.  As a result, judicial power may be less significant. 
Additional Considerations 
A number of additional variables may affect the clarity of this distinction between 
judicial power in constitutional and statutory cases.  These include divided government, 
public opinion, and the political environment.  It is worthwhile to consider the consequences 
of each, but also important to note that the effects of these variables may often only mediate 
the judiciary’s power over an issue for a brief period of time.  
Divided Government 
Divided government is a persistent reality, at least in the last fifty years of American 
politics.  Its influence on the executive and legislative branches has been widely debated, 
with scholars arguing that it affects legislative productivity (Mayhew 1991, Edwards, Barrett, 
and Peake 1997, Howell et al. 2000), alters congressional delegation of authority to the 
bureaucracy (Epstein and O’Halloran 1996), and boosts presidential approval ratings 
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(Nicholson, Segura, and Woods 2002).  Divided government may also affect how (or if) the 
court system is used as an arbiter of the law. 
Having an executive and legislature from different parties may, at least temporarily, 
push some statutory issues into the judiciary, increasing the courts’ power in situations where 
it might normally have little control.  Consider a situation where there is a conflict between 
the legislative and executive branches on a piece of legislation or an executive order.  Rather 
than attempt to veto the bill or write a new law, the opposing branch may choose to challenge 
the legality of the statute or the executive order.  This is particularly true when the courts are 
believed to be ideologically similar to the opposing branch.  When the courts are in this role, 
their decisions may be particularly influential, even on statutory issues.  These decisions may 
also be harder to override in periods of divided government, since the legislative and 
executive branches are likely to have opposing policy preferences. 
In contrast, if there is widespread agreement between the executive and legislative 
branches on an issue, the judiciary may temporarily have less power over the visibility of 
some constitutional issues. This is particularly true in times of unified government.  The 
ability of the executive and legislative branches to essentially ignore a decision they oppose 
or to take a decision they support and broadly expand upon it may make the judiciary’s 
activity less noteworthy than under other circumstances. 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion may also affect courts’ power over constitutional issues.  When public 
sentiment is very strongly for or against a policy position, the legislative and executive 
branches may attempt to make policy on issues they might not ordinarily address.  Recently, 
this battle has become evident on the issue of Internet pornography.  The Supreme Court has 
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tried to claim aspects of the issue as constitutional matters under the First Amendment.  
Nevertheless, because few citizens support children having free access to sexually explicit 
information, Congress continues to very actively monitor and legislate on the issue. 
Political Environment 
The political environment may also affect judicial power over political issues. 
Particularly in a presidential election year, all issues may be refocused around the electoral 
contest.  The judiciary’s visibility may be lower than normal, and even constitutional issues 
that are usually controlled by the courts may be framed in the context of the upcoming 
election.  Often, such discussion centers on the judicial nominating process or the 
composition of the Supreme Court. 
Despite these obstacles, the distinction between constitutional and statutory issues 
remains an enduring way to differentiate between those areas where the judiciary is more and 
less likely to act as a policy venue, and therefore, more or less likely to accept policymaking 
powers.  The sections that follow explain how the courts engage in this process with regard 
to the media and interest groups.  
Interactions with Media 
The actions taken by the judiciary can influence media coverage of the courts alone, 
as well as media coverage of courts in the broader political system.  The sections that follow 
briefly detail the theoretical intuition underlying both. 
Within the Judiciary 
The courts have a vested interest in using the media to present at least some of their 
decisions to the public.  However, this may be a strategic process where all cases are not 
viewed by the justices as equally important.  Accordingly, justices and judges may take steps 
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to increase the visibility of some issues and cases and decrease the visibility of others.  These 
actions may be taken throughout the judicial process.  Case selection and opinion writing are 
two key stages where judges can take actions that may affect media coverage of the courts. 
The case selection stage in discretionary courts allows the judges seated on a given 
court significant latitude to bring new issues into the public eye or to avoid issues they do not 
want to address.  Thus, when a court is presented with a policy issue in need of resolution, it 
may consider how deciding to decide that case—or offering a particular final decision—may 
affect the attention of the media and other policymakers.  
Alternately, justices and judges’ decisions about which cases to consider may result 
in keeping issues off the political agenda.  By deciding not to decide cases that would be 
likely to attract media attention or focus on controversial issues (like the United States 
Supreme Court with gay marriage), a court can assert negative agenda control.  Such a device 
may be particularly useful when the court wants to maintain its public goodwill and remain 
outside the scope of conflict until the political climate is more favorable.  
During the opinion writing stage, in contrast, judges may take steps to make their 
decisions appear more (or less) formal or narrower (or broader) in scope, so that they attract 
varying degrees of media attention.  For example, in a study of television news coverage of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Slotnick and Segal (1998) showed that opinion characteristics 
were significant predictors of media attention.  Decisions that overruled a lower court, altered 
a precedent, or were decided by a small margin (e.g. 5-4) were more likely than other cases 
to receive coverage.  The decision date, too, was significant.  Decisions handed down closer 
to the end of the Court’s term were more likely to receive coverage, perhaps because media 
outlets plan to devote greater attention to the Court at that time. 
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In the Broader Policy Arena 
Researchers have frequently observed that Congress (Walker 1977, Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993) and the executive branch (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Kingdon 1995, Edwards 
and Wood 1999, Canes-Wrone 2001) can affect the media’s coverage of particular issues.  
The ability of officials in these branches to set the media’s agenda gives the institution 
significant power to affect public agendas and policies. 
Previous research on the judiciary, however, has argued that courts much more 
limited agenda-setting ability. One specific illustration of the judiciary’s limited power to 
alter the media’s agenda occurred in the years following the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Roe v. Wade (1973).  Despite the decision’s dramatic liberalizing effect on 
abortion policies, Rosenberg (1991) found that the salience of the abortion issue did not 
increase in the months following the high Court’s decision. 
I argue that (at least in certain political circumstances) the judiciary should, like the 
executive and legislative branches, be able to act as agenda setter and increase the visibility 
of social and political issues. This ability to set the agenda gives the Court tremendous 
institutional power.  It is a result of a number of factors, including the Court’s 
institutionalization and interactions with other institutional and quasi-institutional actors.  It 
may, however, be a more sophisticated or nuanced process than other scholars have found or 
examined. 
Interactions with Interest Groups 
The actions taken by the judiciary can also influence interest group activity before the 
courts, and in the broader political system.  The sections that follow briefly detail the 
theoretical intuition underlying both. 
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Within the Judiciary 
The courts and the judges who sit on these tribunals stand to gain substantial 
knowledge and insight from attracting the attention and input of organized interests.  
Accordingly, they take a number of actions that encourage group participation before the 
judiciary.   First, justices on a court with discretionary jurisdiction may make it known, either 
by public pronouncement or through their decisions, that they are interested in adjudicating 
certain political issues; interest groups are often uniquely equipped to bring these cases 
before the Court.  Groups may also provide the Court with policy expertise and information 
about how a decision will affect its institutional prestige that the Court would not ordinarily 
posses.   
 But, interest groups are not equally likely to engage in all types of cases.   By 
choosing cases that help interest groups to serve their dual goals of influencing public policy 
(Epstein and Rowland 1991, Hansford 2004, Solberg and Waltenburg 2006) and 
organizational maintenance (Wilson 1973, Salisbury 1984, Kobylka 1987, Caldeira and 
Wright 1989, Wasby 1995), the Court can attract greater levels of attention from interest 
groups.  This variation in resource allocation has the potential to affect case and policy 
outcomes. 
In the Broader Policy Arena 
 The Court’s choices about what types of cases to consider should also affect how 
interest groups allocate limited lobbying resources (such as finances [Walker 1983], 
membership [Salisbury 1984, Gray and Lowery 1996], selective benefits [Olson 1965, 
Wilson 1973, Moe 1980], and access to policy-makers [Browne 1990]) across branches.  The 
Court’s short-term policy agenda and long-term reputation for creating salient policy change 
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in an issue area should affect groups’ decision calculus. 
These effects may extend far beyond a given term of the Court.  They may affect not 
only the policy information received by the Court, but also the information received by the 
other branches of the federal government (in this case, the legislature).  In addition, the 
resource allocation of organized interests affects the attentiveness of policy monitoring by 
these groups, and alters the constituencies that policymakers feel the greatest pressure to 
please. 
This specialization creates a symbiotic relationship between interest groups and 
government that reinforces institutions’ positions as policy venues.  A group interested in a 
given issue strategically chooses to lobby a particular branch of government precisely 
because it is the most likely agent to create lasting long- and short-term policy change.    But, 
interest group lobbying in a particular branch of government also generates media attention 
and constituent awareness that further cements that branch’s control over a policy issue.   
Looking Forward 
This dissertation proceeds in four empirical chapters that consider the courts’ 
interactions with two quasi-institutional actors, the media and interest groups.  The first two 
empirical chapters consider the judiciary’s ability to affect the media.  The latter two 
empirical chapters consider the judiciary’s ability to affect interest group activities.   
Each of these sections—the media and interest groups—have two major parts.  The 
first chapter of each section considers how judges and justices affect interactions within the 
judicial system.  The second chapter of each section moves beyond the courts to examine 
how judicial decisions affect media perceptions and lobbying activity in other branches. 
These dual analyses help to paint a more complete picture of the judiciary’s power as an 
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agenda setter.  The paragraphs that follow provide a preview of the findings and highlight a 
number of major themes that will be evident throughout this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 examines how state court judges shape the way the business of the courts is 
presented in the media. Judges can affect the flow of information about their court in two key 
ways.  First, by deciding to decide cases concerning issue areas where the judiciary is more 
(or less) likely to influence public policy, judges can attract attention to a broader (or 
narrower) array of judicial decisions and garner more (or less) in-depth coverage of the issues 
they decide.  Alternately, judges can craft their ultimate decisions to conform to certain 
characteristics that make them more or less appealing to the media.  These characteristics 
affect both the breadth and the depth of the media’s coverage, and are conditioned by the 
political environment in which the court operates. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that composition of the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket can 
affect the types of political issues the general public is exposed to through news coverage.  I 
show that the Court’s ability to act as an agenda setter actually surpasses that of the 
presidency, which appears to be a more reactive institution.  This agenda-setting ability is 
particularly important in constitutional issue areas where the judiciary is more likely to act as 
a policy venue.   
Chapter 4 shows that the characteristics of cases the U.S. Supreme Court decides to 
consider can influence interest groups’ lobbying activities before that body.  Even after 
controlling for other factors that shape interest group participation, significantly more briefs 
are filed in cases that allow interest groups to pursue their dual goals of influencing public 
policy and organizational maintenance.   This finding suggests that the composition of the 
Court’s docket may be extremely important in establishing and maintaining its institutional 
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power, as well as its influence over the American policy making process. 
Chapter 5, further, uses data on interest group activity before the U.S. Supreme Court 
and registered lobbyists before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives to show that 
groups make calculated decisions about how to allocate their lobbying resources.  These 
decisions are affected by a number of factors, including each branch’s overall agenda 
composition.   The findings of this analysis provide further evidence that the types of cases 
the Court decides to decide can have significant policy implications, both in the courts and in 
the federal government. 
Finally, Chapter 6 brings together the findings of the previous four analyses and 
discusses the broader implications of this theory.  It contains a discussion of what the 
findings of this dissertation mean for judicial power and the courts as an agenda-setter in the 
American political system.  It also includes a number of considerations about what the 
findings of this research may mean for future scholarship on the institutional power of the 
American judiciary.
 
 CHAPTER 2 
 
EXPLAINING HOW COURTS AFFECT MEDIA ATTENTION TO JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS
 
One way the judgments of the judiciary set the agenda of other political actors is by 
deciding to decide cases that attract the attention of the news media.   The ability to affect the 
agenda of the news media is significant for the normally secretive judiciary, which needs a 
conduit to reach out to the public.  In many ways, the media acts as this filter through which 
citizens get their information about government and politics, and especially the courts.  To 
most citizens, if political issues are not placed on the policy agenda through media coverage, 
they do not exist.  And, if citizens are not aware of issues, they are unable to demand further 
political change, whether through direct lobbying techniques or by being part of organized 
interest activity that seeks to influence public policy. 
In this chapter, I use evidence from state capital newspapers to examine how courts 
affect media coverage of judicial dockets and decisions.  I find that, by taking cases where 
they can influence public policy and issuing opinions with particular characteristics, the 
judiciary can increase media attention to its business.  These results hold true even after 
controlling for a broad range of environmental factors such media characteristics, judicial 
selection system, and divided government.   This conclusion suggests that judges and justices 
may have greater agenda-setting power than many commentators have suggested. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The secrecy of the U.S. Supreme Court, as evidenced by its longstanding resistance to 
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cameras in the courtroom and sunshine on its conference process, have created a perception 
that the judiciary as a whole desires very little media attention to its business.  But, this 
perception is not entirely true.  Even the high Court has broken its shroud in some cases: 
Individual reporters have been given significant access to the inner workings of the Court 
(e.g. Toobin 2007, Woodward and Armstrong 1979), and a prestigious press corps that has 
included the likes of Linda Greenhouse, Joan Biskupic, and Nina Totenberg carefully report 
the Court’s landmark decisions.   
Lower courts provide a more frequent avenue for judicial transparency.  These 
tribunals generally provide much greater access to the media and the public than the Supreme 
Court, and have been the focus of many television trials.  Moreover, much of the daily 
coverage of many local news sources, for example, focuses on the activities of the judicial 
system, broadly defined.  Stories of murders, thefts, and even high profile divorce cases are 
extremely common.  Whether citizens acknowledge it or not, each of these stories has a large 
judicial component, beginning with police officers and district justices and moving upwards 
through the judicial system to encompass district attorneys, county judges, lawyers, and any 
number of other policy actors. 
In fact, it is far from an exaggeration to say that the judiciary needs media coverage 
for a number of reasons.2  First, the courts rely on news outlets to inform citizens about the 
implications of their often technical decisions.  Reporters can reduce complex legalese to 
language that is comprehensible to the average citizen and make these people understand 
how a decision may affect their life. 
                                                
2 Some reporters have even argued that Supreme Court justices should give up the veil of neutrality in order to 
improve their relations with the public. As veteran Supreme Court reporter Tony Mauro (2010) wrote in USA 
Today, “Clarence Thomas on Face the Nation? John Roberts taking questions posted on YouTube? Sam Alito 
blogging? Why not? Really, why not?” 
 
21 
Second, courts can use the media as a means of providing transparency to (Vanberg 
2005), and in some ways, lobbying the public, who can, in turn, pressure their elected 
representatives to implement policies that are consistent with judicial decisions (Staton 2006, 
2010).  This technique may be particularly important when a court knows that its viewpoint 
is consistent with public opinion.  It may also be important for judges to reach out to citizen 
lobbyists because courts lack the ability to enforce their decisions and often require 
cooperation from the legislative and executive branches of government.  
Finally, it is only with media coverage and a public understanding of the importance 
of the courts’ work that the judiciary can maintain its institutional prestige and aim to 
influence public policy (Greenhouse 1996, Baum 2006).  This allows the judiciary to 
maintain power as an institution, even without the ability to enforce their decisions 
(McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, Carrubba and Rogers 2003).  
Avenues of Judicial Influence 
The courts have a vested interest in using the media to present at least some of their 
decisions to the public.  However, this may be a strategic process where all cases are not 
viewed by the justices as equally important.  Accordingly, justices and judges may take steps 
to increase the visibility of some issues and cases and decrease the visibility of others.  These 
actions may be taken throughout the judicial process.  Here, I focus on case selection and 
opinion writing as two key stages where judges can take actions that may affect media 
coverage of the courts.   
Case Selection 
 Many courts in the American political system have discretionary dockets that allow 
their judges to choose the cases that they want to hear.  This is the system used by the United 
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States Supreme Court, for example, which hears only about 75 of the nearly 10,000 cases 
presented to it each year.  State supreme courts in forty states also have somewhat 
discretionary dockets.  The remaining ten state supreme courts have very limited discretion 
(National Center for State Courts 2009).3 
 A discretionary docket allows the judges seated on a given court significant latitude 
to bring new issues into the public eye or to avoid issues they do not want to address.  Thus, 
when a court is presented with a policy issue in need of resolution, it may consider how 
deciding to decide that case—or offering a particular final decision—may affect the attention 
of the media and other policymakers.  In some cases (such as the issues of enforcement 
discussed earlier), attracting the attention of these other actors and putting the issue on the 
public agenda may be at least a tangential concern for judges and justices. 
Alternately, justices and judges’ decisions about which cases to consider may result 
in keeping issues off the political agenda.  By deciding not to decide cases that would be 
likely to attract media attention or focus on controversial issues (like the United States 
Supreme Court with gay marriage), a court can assert negative agenda control.  Such a device 
may be particularly useful when the court wants to maintain its public goodwill and remain 
outside the scope of conflict until the political climate is more favorable.  
As courts choose cases to decide, they are doubtless aware that the stakes are higher 
for their decisions in some types of cases than others.  For example, recall from Chapter 1 
that, as a result of a variety of agenda-setting processes, the judiciary should be more likely 
to act as a policy venue and have a lasting impact on public policy in some types of cases 
than others.  Among these are constitutional cases, where the courts are given great latitude 
                                                
3 The states with limited discretion are Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
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to interpret the meaning of that document and adapt its provisions to modern America.  
Because the courts have significant power to influence the course of public policy in these 
cases, they may be more likely to attract media attention in the first place.  Thus, judges and 
justices on discretionary courts must be particularly mindful when deciding to decide these 
cases. 
Opinion Writing 
 Judges on both courts of discretionary and mandatory jurisdiction may also alter the 
media attention paid to their decisions during the opinion writing process.  By taking steps to 
make their decisions appear more (or less) formal or narrower (or broader) in scope, judges 
and justices can attract varying degrees of media attention.  For example, in a study of 
television news coverage of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Slotnick and Segal (1998) 
showed that opinion characteristics were significant predictors of media attention.  Decisions 
that overruled a lower court, altered a precedent, or were decided by a small margin (e.g. 5-4) 
were more likely than other cases to receive coverage.  The decision date, too, was 
significant.  Decisions handed down closer to the end of the Court’s term were more likely to 
receive coverage, perhaps because media outlets plan to devote greater attention to the Court 
at that time. 
 This suggests that a court wanting to draw attention to a policy issue would be 
unlikely to issue an important decision as a per curiam opinion on a busy news day.4  Instead, 
such decisions should be handed down during a slower point in the news cycle, and with a 
signed opinion.  In contrast, a court that wanted to conceal its decision in a relatively 
controversial case would do well to reach a unanimous conclusion and issue an unsigned 
                                                
4 This was perhaps the case with the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973), which was decided in 
mid-January.  Coincidentally, this was also the day that former President Lyndon Baines Johnson died, making 
Roe not even front-page news. 
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opinion. 
Why States? 
The analysis that follows considers the relationship between courts and the media 
with specific reference to U.S. state supreme courts.  The decision to use data on state 
supreme court decisions rather than the United States Supreme Court may, at first seem a 
peculiar one.  But, for a number of reasons, it is not only a pragmatic decision, but also one 
that enriches the test of the theory in a way that national level data could not. 
First, applying the foregoing theory to state supreme courts demonstrates its 
universality.  The theory discussed in this dissertation is a theory of judicial power, not an 
exclusive theory of the U.S. Supreme Court’s power. Testing it in state governments clearly 
demonstrates this point. 
Second, testing this theory in state supreme courts demonstrates the wide array of 
cases and issues on which the courts may act as agenda setters.  State supreme courts are the 
courts of last resort for a large proportion of cases handled by the U.S. judicial system. Only 
a fraction of state cases reach the U.S. Supreme Court (and those must involve a federal 
issue); this body decides fewer than 100 cases each year. Therefore, most of the nation’s 
judicial business is conducted in state and other federal courts. 
Last, studying state supreme courts also enables a much more robust test of how the 
political environment affects the courts’ ability to act as an agenda setter.   A study of state 
supreme courts, for example, can account for the varying institutional structures of the media, 
the judiciary, and the state government.  A comprehensive test such as this is nearly 
impossible using data from the Supreme Court, which has no cross-sectional institutional 
variation. 
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Controlling for these variations is especially important because previous research on 
the media and the judiciary demonstrates that the political environment may temper the 
amount of coverage received by judicial decisions.  For example, scholars have found that 
media outlets with greater circulation and resources are more likely to cover the courts than 
those with lesser resources (Hale 2006).   Multiple news outlets in a city, especially in the 
case of newspapers, may also promote additional coverage of local issues (Schaffner and 
Wagner 2006).  The competition that results over readership and profits at a time that many 
newspapers are in danger of collapse may drive these outlets to pay more careful attention to 
political issues than under other circumstances. 
Media ownership may also affect the type of coverage received by the courts; outlets 
that are locally owned may rely less on national news staff and more on reporters within the 
community, leading to greater coverage of local issues.  In an analysis of media coverage of 
judicial elections, for example, Schaffner and Diascro (2007) found that locally owned 
newspapers provided twice the coverage of state high court contests than their chain-owned 
counterparts.   
In addition, the accountability of the judiciary may also affect the likelihood that 
cases receive coverage.  In the American states, this means that, holding the size of a court’s 
docket and prestige constant, decisions by elected judges may be more newsworthy than 
those made by appointed judges.  This is especially true in years where judges on that court 
are facing reelection.  In these cases, it becomes increasingly more important that citizens are 
aware of the issues that judges consider, as well as decisions made by incumbent judges 
while serving on the court. 
The importance of selection system and the proximity of judicial elections is not a 
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new idea.  Scholars have long examined how judicial selection systems affect judges’ 
decisions  (Hall 1987, Hall 1992, Brace and Hall 1993, Brace and Hall 1995, Hall 1995, 
Brace, Hall, and Langer 1999) and considered how selection systems and other institutional 
factors affect the presence and quality of challengers in judicial elections (Bonneau and Hall 
2003).  It should, therefore, be unsurprising that such factors would also influence courts’ 
relationships with the media. 
Finally, other features of state governments, particularly their partisan composition, 
may also affect courts’ ability to attract media attention.  As noted in Chapter 1, in times of 
divided government, the courts’ ability to act as a policy venue on certain issues may 
fluctuate.  In addition, in times of divided government the contentiousness between the 
governor and the legislature may be such an engaging story that it makes covering the courts 
a less interesting story. 
Hypotheses 
This theory of the judiciary’s ability to set the media’s agenda leads to several 
hypotheses about media coverage of the courts.  These affect both the probability that a given 
case will receive coverage (breadth of coverage) and how much coverage that case will 
receive (depth of coverage).  Both of these concepts measure a court’s ability to put an issue 
on the public agenda.  The breadth of coverage provided by the media taps into the scope of 
issues a court’s decisions can expose to the public, while the depth of coverage is a gauge of 
how well the courts can make these issues “stick” in a crowded news environment. 
Case Selection and Public Policy 
First, courts should attract more media attention in cases where they have greater 
ability to influence public policy.  A useful empirical distinction in the policy issues handled 
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by the judiciary is the difference between constitutional and non-constitutional decisions.  
Although the judiciary decides far fewer constitutional than non-constitutional cases, courts 
have much broader latitude to influence public policy in constitutional cases than in other 
cases.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, constitutional cases should be more likely to 
receive more coverage than their non-constitutional counterparts. 
A court’s ability to influence public policy, however, is certainly more nuanced.  
Within the category of constitutional issues, for example, some judicial decisions should be 
particularly likely to attract media attention.  Death penalty cases are one example where the 
judiciary’s broad latitude in decision-making is perceived to have a significant impact on 
society.  In these cases, judges make determinations that affect public safety, and literally 
choosing between life and death.  The stakes are high in these cases, and the courts’ role is 
large.  Accordingly, courts should attract more attention in death penalty cases than other 
cases. 
In contrast, courts may have particularly limited power to make lasting policy 
decisions in some non-constitutional issue areas.  Torts, for example, are highly technical and 
heavily regulated by executive branch regulations and legislation.  Most tort decisions are 
also narrow in scope and affect only a small group of citizens.  Thus, most judicial decisions 
regarding torts should attract relatively little media attention.  
Opinion Characteristics 
 A court’s actions during the decision-making process should also affect the types of 
cases that receive media attention.  Cases that are contentious—either because the court’s 
decision is closely divided or because the court alters a lower court’s decision—should 
attract more media attention (Slotnick and Segal 1998).  And, opinions that are signed by the 
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judges or justices of the court send a message about the case’s political or social significance.  
If a case is truly significant, it is unlikely that judges will dismiss it with a per curiam 
decision or without extended discussion. Therefore, signed opinions should receive more 
media coverage than their unsigned counterparts.5 
Political Environment 
 As the theory postulates, courts’ ability to influence media coverage through case 
selection and opinion writing should be affected by the political environment in which both 
the courts and the media operate.  The media’s capacity to provide coverage, as well as the 
economic pressures of the community, may limit or enhance coverage.  Newspapers with 
greater circulation and a local owner, as well as competition within the city should, for 
example, provide more comprehensive news coverage than in other cases.  A judicial 
election should put the courts on the political agenda more than in other years.  And, divided 
government is likely to create such a contentious political environment in state government 
that news outlets shift resources away from the judiciary, reducing coverage of the courts’ 
decisions. 
Data and Methods 
This analysis relies on two dependent variables assembled using state capital 
newspapers’ coverage of their own high courts.  It also includes a series of independent and 
control variables that capture variations in judicial decisions and the political environments in 
which they are made.  These variables, along with the models used to conduct these inquiries 
are described in greater detail in the following sections.  
                                                
5 The unsigned opinion, of course, may also be a strategic tool for judges who want to downplay the 
significance of a particular decision.  However, it is difficult to systematically determine when judges and 
justices are using this mechanism.  Thus, since the signed v. per curiam distinction has been used in previous 
research (Slotnick and Segal 1998) as a proxy for contentiousness, I continue to use it here. 
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Dependent Variables 
 This analysis employs two dependent variables—a dummy variable that indicates 
whether or not a case received coverage in its own state capital newspaper and a count 
variable indicating how many times each case was discussed in its own state capital paper.6  
Using two dependent variables allows me to consider two separate but related ideas: whether 
cases received any coverage (breadth of coverage) and the amount of coverage received by 
each case (depth of coverage).  As previously discussed, considering both of these dependent 
variables provides a more nuanced impression of how judges and justices are able to set the 
media’s agenda through their case selection and opinion writing.  
Both the binary and count variables were created using state supreme court coverage 
from calendar year 1998.  I used 1998 because it was the most recent year available in the 
Brace and Hall (2002) State Supreme Court Data Project, a comprehensive database of state 
supreme court decisions from all fifty states between 1995 and 1998.  All states whose 
largest circulation state capital newspaper was archived in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 
for 1998 were included in the analysis.7  This led to the inclusion of twenty states and papers, 
                                                
6 I could also have chosen to use the largest circulation state papers (see Wilhelm and Vining 2009), but chose 
to use state capital papers for several reasons.  First, even among largest circulation papers, there would be 
variation in size and, therefore, resources available to cover the courts (the largest circulation paper in 
Wyoming, the Wyoming Tribune Eagle, is still very different from the New York Times).  Second, using largest 
circulation papers would introduce another kind of variation—distance from the state capital—that could also 
affect news coverage of state supreme courts. 
 
7 The states and papers included in this analysis are: Arkansas ([Little Rock] Arkansas Democrat Gazette), 
Colorado (Denver Post), Georgia (Atlanta Journal-Constitution), Illinois ([Springfield] State Journal Register), 
Kansas (Topeka Capital Journal), Louisiana (The [Baton Rouge] Advocate), Massachusetts (Boston Globe), 
Maryland (The [Annapolis] Capital), North Carolina ([Raleigh] News and Observer), North Dakota (Bismarck 
Tribune), New Mexico (Santa Fe New Mexican), New York ([Albany] Times-Union), Ohio (Columbus 
Dispatch), Rhode Island (Providence Journal), Texas (Austin American Statesman), Utah (Salt Lake Tribune), 
Virginia (Richmond Times-Dispatch), Wisconsin ([Madison] Wisconsin State Journal), West Virginia 
(Charleston Gazette), and Wyoming ([Cheyenne] Wyoming Tribune-Eagle). 
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and a total of 3,012 cases. 
To identify whether or not a case received news coverage as well as how much 
coverage a case received, I searched the 1998 Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe archives of 
each state capital newspaper using the over-inclusive term “supreme court.”8  All stories 
identified by the search engine were collected and read by a single coder to verify that they 
related to that state’s highest court and not the United States Supreme Court or the supreme 
court of another state.  If the story was appropriate, the case(s) discussed in its text were 
identified using characteristics such as the plaintiff, defendant, or opinion author.  These 
characteristics were then matched to case characteristics in the Brace and Hall State Supreme 
Court Data Project.   
After identification, cases were coded on each of the variables.  Cases were coded 1 
on the news coverage variable if they received any attention in the media and 0 otherwise.  
Cases were also assigned a value for the news count variable, which indicated how many 
total stories mentioned that case.  Overall, 16 percent of cases decided by state supreme 
courts in 1998 received coverage in state capital newspapers.  Of these cases, 77 percent 
were discussed only once.  The remaining 23 percent of cases received multiple mentions 
(ranging from two to sixteen articles).  Generally speaking, scandals in government, death 
penalty cases, and school finance decisions received the most attention. 
There is every reason to expect that the twenty-state sample used in this analysis is a 
representative sample of state supreme court business.  Moreover, it appears that 1998 is a 
rather average year in state supreme court business.  As shown in Table 2.1, the percentage 
of criminal and civil cases is relatively consistent across all cases included in the Brace and 
                                                
8 Most decision dates are far enough removed from the end of the year (judges like to celebrate December 
holidays, too!) that I made the decision to code only 1998 rather than attempting to define an arbitrary endpoint 
for coding into 1999. 
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Hall Data Project, all cases decided in 1998, and the cases included in the analysis.   This 
pattern holds true for a number of other case characteristics, including whether the decision 
concerned a constitutional issue, was unanimous, or altered a lower court decision. 
Independent Variables 
The primary independent variables of interest included in this model relate to the 
issue area of the case and the characteristics of the courts’ final opinions.  The paragraphs 
that follow consider the measurement of each of these in turn.   
Issue Variables 
The courts’ ability to affect news coverage by choosing to hear a case where it may 
influence public policy is measured using a binary variable that separates constitutional and 
non-constitutional cases.  This has been chosen as a proxy variable and will be used 
throughout the dissertation as a basic measure of the judiciary’s ability to act as a policy 
venue. 
For the purpose of this analysis, a constitutional case is any case that concerns either a 
state or federal constitutional issue.  These cases are combined into one variable to eliminate 
concerns about collinearity.  Because the federal and state constitutions include many of the 
same provisions, many cases that related to a state constitutional issue also concerned a 
federal constitutional issue, and vice versa.  In fact, the Brace and Hall databases’ values for 
whether a case concerned a state constitutional issue and a federal constitutional issue 
matched 97 percent of the time. Cases concerning constitutional issues are coded 1 and were 
present in approximately 4 percent of cases.9 
                                                
9 This percentage is much lower than the percentage of constitutional cases adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  This is likely the result of the jurisdiction of state supreme courts, which requires courts in many states 
to hear and dispose of a much greater number of mandatory jurisdiction cases (which are often not 
constitutional) than the federal supreme court. 
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The models also include two additional independent variables measuring specific 
policy areas where the courts’ ability to influence public policy may be particularly high or 
low.  First, a binary variable is used to indicate those cases where the court either considered 
or imposed the death penalty; this was the case in 4 percent of decisions.  As discussed in the 
hypotheses, death penalty cases are representative of a particular class of constitutional cases 
where the courts are particularly likely to make decisions with significant policy 
implications.  These cases may, therefore, also be more likely to attract media attention.  
Second, the models also include a measure of whether the case concerned a tort.  As 
discussed in the hypotheses, tort cases are representative of a class of statutory decisions 
where courts have limited ability to influence public policy and thus, these decisions should 
be especially unlikely to receive news coverage.  Tort cases include any cases that Brace and 
Hall (2002) classified as falling under the general issue category of civil government or civil 
private torts.  Examples include employee injury, workers’ compensation, professional 
malpractice, and libel cases. Nearly 25 percent of cases fit these criteria; these cases are 
coded 1. 
Opinion Characteristics 
 The models also control for three opinion characteristics that may affect the quantity 
and quality of news coverage of state supreme court cases.  Unlike the issue area of the case, 
these variables are factors judges can influence after the case has been heard and considered, 
even in mandatory jurisdiction cases.  These characteristics are whether the decision of the 
court was unanimous, whether the opinion was signed, and whether the decision altered the 
opinion of one or more lower courts.  These characteristics are derived from the Brace and 
Hall State Supreme Court Data Project.  They are coded 1 if the characteristic is present and 
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0 otherwise.  For more descriptive statistics on these variables, see Table 2.1. 
Controlling for the Political Environment 
Both the binary and count models include several controls for the political 
environment, which may alter judges’ ability to affect media coverage about their court.  
These variables fall into three major categories: media characteristics, judicial characteristics, 
and divided government. 
Media Characteristics 
The first three environmental factors relate to the characteristics of the media. 
Information on each of these variables was collected from the 1998 edition of the Editor and 
Publisher International Year Book (Editor and Publisher 1998).  First, newspaper circulation 
is a continuous variable that measures each paper’s average weekday sales.  The circulation 
of the newspapers included in this analysis ranges from nearly 17,000 to almost 477,000.  
The average circulation of papers included in this analysis is approximately 160,000 copies 
per day.   
Second, newspaper ownership is a binary variable that divides newspapers into two 
categories: those published by media conglomerates (coded 0 in the analysis) and those that 
are locally owned and operated (coded 1 in the analysis). Overall, five of the twenty state 
capital newspapers included in this study were locally owned.  This accounted for 
approximately 25 percent of all cases.   
Finally, state high court cases are coded 1 if they were decided in cities with multiple 
daily papers and 0 if they were decided in cities with only one major daily newspaper.  
Overall, five of the twenty capital cities included in this analysis had multiple papers.  These 
states accounted for roughly 25 percent of cases. 
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Judicial Characteristics 
  The models also control for two characteristics of the judiciary.  The first of these 
judicial characteristics is a binary variable indicating whether a state held an election for its 
supreme court in 1998.  States that held an election are coded 1; all other states are coded 0.  
Of the states included in this sample, five held elections in 1998.  Four of these states held 
partisan elections, and one held a non-partisan election.10 Just over 30 percent of cases were 
decided in states holding elections in 1998.11 
Each state high court’s caseload is considered by using a binary variable measuring 
whether the court has a discretionary docket.  I use the discretionary docket variable for two 
reasons.  First, courts with discretionary dockets generally consider fewer cases than their 
counterparts with mandatory jurisdiction.  Second, a discretionary docket allows its judges 
greater latitude over the cases they choose to consider.  This, in turn, empowers the court to 
make a greater (or lesser) number of judgments that may attract media coverage.  This 
variable is coded 1 for cases decided in states where the court has largely discretionary 
jurisdiction and 0 otherwise.  Of the states included in this analysis, fifteen had discretionary 
dockets.  These states accounted for almost 80 percent of the cases in this study.12 
Divided Government 
 Finally, the models consider whether a state had divided government in 1998.  
                                                
10 I also tested other models employing more nuanced measures of judicial selection.  The results of these 
models were substantively similar to those shown here. 
 
11 All cases considered in states that held elections in 1998 were coded 1, regardless of it the coverage was 
before or after the election.  This is done for a number of reasons.  First, defining an endpoint for election 
coverage would also require defining a beginning, and such a definition would be arbitrary, and likely vary 
widely across states.  Second, nuanced coding of pre- and post election coverage of cases would have been quite 
difficult on the count variable. 
 
12A separate model also controlled for the size of the courts’ docket.  This variable was collinear with the 
newspaper circulation and performed similarly to the binary measure of discretionary dockets.  
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Divided government is defined as having a governor and at least one house of the state 
legislature controlled by different political parties.  States with divided control are coded as 1 
and unified states are coded as 0.  Fourteen of the twenty states included in this analysis had 
divided government, accounting for 66 percent of cases. 
Model Estimation 
The model considering the court’s affect on the breadth of news coverage is estimated 
using probit estimation.  Probit is a maximum likelihood estimator appropriate for use with 
binary response variables.  The model predicts the probability of an event—in this case, 
newspaper coverage of a state supreme court decision—occurring in the absence or presence 
of particular independent variables. The probit model is based on the normal distribution and 
assumes an error term with a variance of one. 
The model estimating the courts’ affect on the depth of news coverage is estimated 
using an event count model, specifically negative binomial regression.  I choose to use 
negative binomial regression rather than a Poisson model because the negative binomial 
model accounts for (by estimating an additional parameter) overdispersion, or greater 
variance than might be expected given the mean of the data.  I expect that overdispersion 
could be cause for concern in this model, given the large number of observations that receive 
no coverage.13  In addition, the negative binomial model also accounts for a potential 
violation of the assumption of conditional independence of observations, or where the 
occurrence of one event makes another event more or less likely.  In this case, once a reporter 
has put the resources into covering a case at one stage of the judicial process (for example, 
                                                
13 Some readers might argue for the use of a zero-inflated model in the presence of so many zero observations 
on the dependent variable.  However, there is no reason to think that there are differing theoretical explanations 
for why an observation falls in the zero group or the non zero group and why an observation may be greater 
than one.  Thus, a zero inflated model is theoretically inappropriate. 
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oral argument) it is more likely that a paper might choose to follow up on that story later in 
the process (perhaps on decision day). 
The models used in this paper also employ robust standard errors.  Robust standard 
errors are generally used when there is a small departure from the fundamental assumptions 
of the model.  In this case, the assumption of conditional independence of observations has 
likely been violated.  There are multiple case observations from each of the twenty states, 
and it is likely that the residuals for observations within each state will be correlated.  
Findings: Breadth of Coverage  
The model of news coverage shown in Table 2.2 demonstrates support for most of the 
hypotheses regarding the breadth of news coverage of state supreme courts.  The results of 
this model, therefore, indicate dramatic differences in the likelihood of cases receiving 
coverage based on their characteristics.  By deciding to decide certain types of cases or 
crafting opinions that have particular identifying features, judges can influence the visibility 
of courts as a whole, as well as specific political issues. 
First, consider the courts’ ability to set the media’s agenda by deciding to decide 
particular types of cases.  I postulated that the courts would attract greater media attention in 
cases where they acted as policy venues; this hypothesis received strong support. 
Constitutional cases were 27 percent more likely to receive media attention than their non-
constitutional counterparts.  This is the largest substantive difference seen in the probit 
model, and almost twice as large as the next largest effect.  Clearly, issue area and judicial 
discretion matter for attracting at least a minimal level of media attention. 
More specific case types also demonstrate evidence for the importance of issue area 
in determining a case’s probability of news coverage.  Death penalty cases, for example, 
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were 15 percent more likely than other cases to receive news coverage. And, tort cases were 
4 percent less likely than other cases to receive news coverage.  
It also appears that courts can influence the probability of a case receiving news 
coverage by crafting opinions with particular characteristics.  Unanimous decisions, for 
example, were 6 percent less likely than other cases to receive news coverage.  Signed 
opinions and decisions that altered a lower court’s verdict increased a case’s predicted 
probability of news coverage by 8 percent and 2 percent, respectively. 
Importantly, these effects for issue area and opinion characteristics hold true even in 
the presence of controls for political environment.  Media characteristics had particularly 
significant effects.   Cases decided in capital cities with two major daily newspapers, for 
example, were 15 percent more likely to receive news coverage than those decided in a 
capital city with one paper.  And, cases decided in cities with higher circulations and locally 
owned papers were both about 6 percent more likely to receive news coverage than cases 
decided in cities with lower circulation newspapers. 
Judicial characteristics were also statistically and substantively important.  Both the 
variable indicating whether a state held a judicial election in 1998 and the control for whether 
the court had a mandatory or discretionary docket were significant predictors of whether a 
case received coverage.  Cases decided in states that held elections in 1998 were 6 percent 
more likely to receive news coverage, while cases decided in states with discretionary 
dockets were 3 percent less likely to receive news coverage. 
Findings: Depth of Coverage 
The count model shown in Table 2.3 also provides substantial support for the courts’ 
ability to affect media coverage by choosing to decide cases that will “stick” on the political 
38 
agenda.  The issue area of the case is again the most important predictor of how much 
coverage a case received; cases concerning constitutional cases receive 360 percent more 
coverage than non-constitutional cases.  Death penalty cases also received an increased 
quantity of coverage, about 180 percent more than other cases.  Torts, in contrast, received 
39 percent less coverage than other cases. 
The courts’ ability to affect media coverage by crafting judicial opinions with 
particular characteristics also persisted in this model.  Unanimous decisions received 38 
percent less coverage than other cases.  And, cases decided with signed opinions received 
176 percent more coverage than their unsigned counterparts.  
 And, once again, the political environment also influenced the courts’ ability to act as 
an agenda setter.  Cases decided in cities with two newspapers received 237 percent more 
coverage than cases decided in one-paper cities.  Similarly, cases decided in cities with 
locally owned papers received 140 percent more coverage.  And cases decided in states with 
divided government received 33 percent less coverage than cases decided in states where the 
same party controlled the executive and legislative branches. 
 To get an idea of the substantive implications of these findings, consider the 
following example.  A constitutional case decided with a signed opinion and in a capital city 
with two newspapers would receive roughly two more stories than a non-constitutional case 
with an unsigned opinion decided in a one paper city, holding all else constant.  Since the 
mean number of stories mentioning each case is .23, this is a substantial increase in media 
attention, especially when considering only three variables. 
Breadth v. Depth 
 In many ways, the two models are very similar.  The direction of the effects of the 
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individual variables observed in each of the models, for example, fluctuates very little. 
Moreover, both models provide persuasive evidence that, even after controlling for the 
political environment, judges have some ability to affect the type of information citizens 
receive about their courts.  Whether by choosing to decide cases that address (or do not 
address) certain issues or crafting their opinions to meet particular characteristics, judges are 
active participants in the agenda-setting process.  This is true in both courts with 
discretionary and non-discretionary dockets; the models indicate only small differences 
across these two types of courts (discussed in greater detail below). 
In both models, constitutional cases, death penalty cases, and having two papers in a 
city have the greatest effect on the news coverage received by a case.  The substantive 
impacts of each of these predictors cannot be underestimated.  The effects of each of these 
variables on judges’ ability to set the media’s agenda are considered further in the discussion 
section of this chapter. 
The circulation of the newspaper, having a discretionary docket, and the presence of 
judicial elections appear to be more important predictors of whether a case receives coverage 
at all than how much coverage that case will receive.  All of these predictors have modest 
statistically significant effects in the news coverage model.  However, only judicial elections 
remain significant in the count model.  These are reasonable findings; one might expect 
circulation to affect a paper’s ability to cover a broad number of issues before it affected a 
paper’s ability to cover the same issue in depth.  Elections may bring to light more issues in 
passing than in other cases.  And, discretionary courts may consider fewer cases of interest in 
a given year (perhaps in an exercise of negative agenda control). 
In contrast, divided government, especially, seems to matter more in determining the 
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depth of coverage a case will receive than the breadth of the media’s attention to the 
judiciary. This suggests that individual judicial decisions may receive more intensive 
attention from the media when conflict between the governor and the legislature is lower.  
The cause of this phenomenon is not immediately clear.  It may be that unified control frees 
up news space or is more likely to make the court a controversial figure than under divided 
government.  
Discussion 
The findings of this analysis provide support for the broad contention that judges can 
play a role in shaping the agenda of the media. They can do this in two key ways.  First, by 
deciding to decide cases concerning certain issue areas where the court is more (or less) 
likely to influence public policy (act as policy venues) a court can attract attention to a 
broader (or narrower) array of judicial decisions and garner more (or less) in-depth coverage 
of the issues they decide.  Or, judges can craft their decisions to conform to certain 
characteristics (i.e. unanimous decision, unsigned opinion) that make them more or less 
appealing to the media.  These characteristics also affect both the breadth and the depth of 
the media’s coverage, and are conditioned by the political environment in which the court 
operates. 
The Judges’ Role 
 It is important to note that the issue area of the case—especially whether a case 
concerns a constitutional issue—had the largest substantive effect on both the breadth and 
depth of news coverage.  This suggests that by deciding to decide cases related to certain 
political issues (or by deciding to decide cases on constitutional or statutory grounds), the 
courts have significant power to put issues on the public agenda.  They may also have great 
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latitude to keep issues off the public agenda by deciding not to decide particular cases and 
issues. 
 For example, by repeatedly becoming involved in the battle over school funding, the 
Ohio Supreme Court has helped to keep an important political issue on the public agenda and 
tried to assure equality for all children.  One exhibit of the court’s influence can be seen in 
the wake of its 1997 decision, just one in a series of battles between the court and the Ohio 
legislature.  Although the court did not even consider the issue in 1998, it was mentioned in 
more stories than any other Ohio Supreme Court decision during that year.  One reason why 
this case was followed so closely was likely its reaching impact on both public policy and a 
large number of Ohio residents.  But, if the court had not decided to get involved in this 
battle, the window of opportunity would likely have closed on this concern.14 
 The characteristics of the court’s opinion in a case had somewhat more modest effects 
on the breadth and depth of the coverage received by the judiciary than issue area.  
Nevertheless, the persistence of these effects suggests that judges are able to affect the 
media’s coverage throughout the judicial process, and empowers judges and justices with a 
much greater ability to take actions to influence the media’s agenda than is often accorded to 
officers of the court. 
 One example of a case that may have garnered additional attention because of the 
characteristics of the opinion—non-unanimous, signed, altering a lower court decision—may 
be the Colorado Supreme Court case of Bayer v. Crested Butte (1998). This case asked the 
narrow question of which of two Colorado transportation laws governed ski lift maintenance 
during the winter season.  Had the judges of the court agreed and/or issued an unsigned 
                                                
14 Of course, this action also had benefits for the court, which clearly increased its visibility with the general 
public.  And, by repeatedly declaring unpopular financing plans approved by the legislature to be 
unconstitutional, the court garnered a great deal of goodwill with citizens. 
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opinion, this case would likely have received only limited attention in trade publications for 
ski resorts.  Instead, it was one of the 16 percent of cases that received coverage—and in 
multiple stories, at that! 
Environmental Effects 
The model also shows that judges’ decisions must be contextualized within the larger 
political system.  Although judges may have some control over which cases are covered by 
the media and how often, this varies with the characteristics of the media and the courts, as 
well as with the partisan control of the state.  Several of these characteristics merit special 
consideration because of trends present in modern politics. 
First, consider news media ownership and publication.  In the past, it was common 
practice for most medium and large cities to have two newspapers.  In many cases, one of 
these papers was published in the morning and the other was published in the afternoon. For 
example, before their merger in 1991, the city of Little Rock had the Arkansas Gazette, 
which was published in the morning, and Arkansas Democrat, which was published in the 
afternoon for most of its history.  Local families or individuals also owned many of these 
newspapers.  But the numbers of both locally owned newspapers and two newspaper cities 
have steadily declined over the last several decades (Editor and Publisher 1998).  In a very 
recent and visible case, for example, one of the few remaining two paper cities, Denver, 
Colorado, lost its second paper, the Rocky Mountain News, on February 27, 2009.  Today, the 
Denver Post is the only daily newspaper published in the Denver metropolitan area.  And, it 
seems that every time we turn around, we hear stories of yet another newspaper up for sale or 
struggling to survive.15 
                                                
15 In fact, of the five states that had two state capital papers in 1998, only three remain in print editions today—
the Charleston, West Virginia Gazette and Daily Mail, the Boston, Massachusetts Globe and Herald, and the 
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 But, the findings of this and other research suggest that if the trends of media 
consolidation and newspaper closures continue, it is likely that citizens’ knowledge of state 
supreme courts will suffer.   Fewer stories, and less in-depth coverage mean fewer 
opportunities for citizens to truly learn about what state supreme courts do and the types of 
cases they adjudicate. This change could potentially create a public that is vastly unaware of 
the activities of one of the major branches of their government.  
Second, consider the role of judicial elections in increasing the visibility of judicial 
business.  As these contests become more polarized and more costly (Goldberg et al. 2005), 
state legislatures inevitably consider how the states’ selection systems can be reformed to 
maintain the integrity of the judicial process.  One common proposal is for states to move 
away from holding elections, choosing instead to appoint judges, or to use a hybrid selection 
model such as the Missouri Plan, which can take many forms, but usually combines 
gubernatorial or legislative appointment with a non-partisan nominating commission.  
However, this analysis suggests that these changes may have potential consequences for 
citizens’ awareness of the business of their judiciary. 
 Finally, note that in states with divided government, state supreme court cases 
received less in-depth coverage than in states with a unified legislature and executive.  This is 
likely the result of a limited news hole for politics being filled by a “better” or more 
contentious story.  Once again, this potentially jeopardizes citizens’ knowledge of one of the 
three main branches of their state government.  In an era where divided government is more a 
norm than an anomaly, we should be concerned that the contentious relationship between the 
legislature and the executive may have consequences beyond those that scholars have 
                                                                                                                                                  
Salt Lake City, Utah Deseret News and Tribune.  Denver, Colorado (Post and Rocky Mountain News), discussed 
in text, and Madison, Wisconsin (State Journal and Capital Times) have both seen their second newspaper 
move to an online only edition since 2008. 
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originally considered.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter begins to offer evidence for how the court can affect the agendas of 
other political actors.  Specifically, it demonstrates that, through case selection and opinion 
writing, the courts can affect the depth and breadth of media coverage provided to the 
judiciary.  This ability, however, is conditioned on the political environment in which the 
court operates, including the characteristics of the media, the court, and the partisan control 
of state government. 
This chapter, however, examines judicial decisions in isolation.  It can only speak to 
how judges’ decisions affect coverage of their own business.  But, it is possible that the 
judiciary’s decisions to consider particular political issues can also affect the media’s broader 
attention to political issues.  A decision, for example, may attract media attention to an issue, 
which may follow that issue through the legislative or executive branches.  Chapter 3 uses 
time serial data from the Policy Agendas Project to shed greater light on this phenomenon. 
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Table 2.1. Characteristics of State Supreme Court Decisions 
 
 All Cases in 
Database 
All 1998 Cases 
in Database 
Cases Included 
in Analysis 
% Criminal 31.92 31.65 31.19 
% Civil 65.84 66.26 66.49 
% Other 2.24 2.09 2.32 
% Constitutional Cases 4.69 3.44 3.65 
% Death Penalty 5.31 5.61 4.02 
% Torts 22.50 24.40 24.14 
% Unanimous Decisions 78.72 77.30 78.55 
% Alter Lower Court Decision 40.57 40.37 39.85 
% Signed Opinions 84.11 82.73 78.61 
Total Cases 28,332 7,045 3,012 
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Table 2.2. Predictors of the Breadth of News Coverage of State Supreme Courts 
 
 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
Change in Predicted 
Probability 
Case Type    
  Constitutional Issue .870    
(.125) 
*** .27 
  Death Penalty .520   
(.130) 
*** .15 
  Torts -.201   
(.072) 
*** -.04 
Opinion Characteristics    
  Unanimous Decision -.246   
(.070) 
*** -.06 
  Alter Lower Court Decision .104    
(.059) 
* .02 
  Signed Opinion .392   
(.083) 
*** .08 
Political Environment    
  Two Papers .589  
(.084) 
*** .15 
  Local Owner .216   
(.086) 
** .05 
  Circulation .0000005   
(.0000003) 
* .05 
  Discretionary Docket -.156   
(.090) 
* -.03 
  Judicial Election .260    
(.072) 
*** .06 
  Divided Government -.092 
(.069) 
 -.02 
Constant -1.40   
(.155) 
***  
Pseudo l  -1222.24   
Wald 
2 
188.46   
P .000   
R
2
M&Z 0.13   
 
n=3,012 
*Significant at p < .10 (two-tailed). 
**Significant at p< .05 (two-tailed). 
***Significant at p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Table 2.3. Predictors of the Depth of News Coverage of State Supreme Courts 
 
 
 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
IRR 
Case Type    
  Constitutional Issue 1.28    
(.200) 
*** 3.60 
  Death Penalty .587   
(.193) 
*** 1.80 
  Torts -.484   
(.130) 
*** .61 
Opinion Characteristics    
  Unanimous Decision -.479   
(.142) 
*** .62 
  Alter Lower Court Decision .189    
(.115) 
* 1.21 
  Signed Opinion .564   
(.161) 
*** 1.76 
Political Environment    
  Two Papers .862 
  (.150) 
*** 2.37 
  Local Owner .344   
(.171) 
** 1.4 
  Circulation .0000005   
(.0000005) 
 1.0 
  Discretionary Docket -.246   
(.200) 
 .78 
  Judicial Election .326    
(.162) 
* 1.39 
  Divided Government -.402 
(.344) 
*** .67 
Constant -1.77   
(.344) 
***  
 2.34   
Pseudo l  -1666.60   
Wald 2 218.73   
P .000   
R2MLE 0.06   
 
n=3,012 
*Significant at p < .10 (two-tailed). 
**Significant at p< .05 (two-tailed). 
***Significant at p < .01 (two-tailed). 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
EXPLAINING HOW COURTS INFLUENCE THE PUBLIC AGENDA
 
The previous chapter provided evidence that the composition of courts’ dockets affects how 
the business of the judiciary is portrayed in the media.  However, that chapter did not speak 
to courts’ broader ability to influence the issues that appear on the public agenda, taking 
account of the agendas of the other political branches.  The ability to compete with the 
legislative and executive branches to put issues on the agenda, if it exists, would be even 
more significant than the ability to manipulate coverage of the courts.  This broader agenda 
setting role would also suggest much greater judicial power than many scholars (e.g. 
Rosenberg 1991) have suggested.  It would also suggest an even larger role for the judgments 
of the judiciary in altering the visibility of political issues. 
 To examine the courts’ ability to act as agenda setters in the political system, this 
chapter considers the courts in context.  Using data from the Policy Agendas Project, it 
explores whether the agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court influences the types of policy issues 
that receive media coverage, even after controlling for the agendas of the executive and 
legislative branches.16  Using a time-series cross-sectional model, it demonstrates that the 
judgments made by the judiciary, do, indeed influence the issues that are covered in the 
                                                
16 As will be discussed later, the agendas of these branches are defined using information on the issues 
considered by each branch in a given year.  The data is obtained from Baumgartner and Jones’ Policy Agendas 
Project dataset. 
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media.  Courts may even have greater agenda-setting abilities than the executive branch.  
This relationship varies over issue area, with the Supreme Court’s power being even greater 
in areas where it has the greatest ability to make lasting policy change. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 The ability of political institutions—and policy entrepreneurs within those 
institutions—to put issues on the media and public agendas has been the subject of a great 
deal of public policy literature over the last forty years (e.g. Cobb and Elder 1972, 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Kingdon 1995, Mintrom 1997).  Much of this literature, 
however, has put the president or Congress at the center of the policy process.  In so doing, 
these studies have largely ignored the role that the courts (and the judges and justices that 
make up those bodies) may play in putting issues on the public agenda.17   
 The paragraphs that follow explore the existing literature on the executive and 
legislative branches as agenda setters.  I then consider the role of the courts, specifically the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in putting issues on the media and public agendas.  After examining the 
existing literature on the relationship between courts and the media, I discuss why the 
judiciary’s power to set the agenda is much greater than existing research suggests. 
Agenda Setting in the Executive Branch 
For years, scholars have argued that the president may be the most important agenda 
setter in the American policy process (e.g. Cobb and Elder 1972, Bond and Fleisher 1990, 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Kingdon 1995, Cohen 1995).  The president, unlike his 
colleagues in Congress, faces no collective action problem and can speak for the American 
people in a single voice.  He is a representative of the nation at home and abroad, and has 
                                                
17 Of course, the ability to place issues on the public agenda is not solely confined to institutional actors.  Non-
institutional actors, such as political parties and interest groups, may also play a significant role in this process. 
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easy access to the bully pulpit.  In addition, through daily press briefings and weekly radio 
broadcasts, the president also has more direct access to the media and the American people 
than the legislative or judicial branches. 
However, empirical research has not fully supported these claims.    Some scholars, 
for example, have found no relationship between a president’s State of the Union Address 
(usually viewed as his main agenda-setting tool during the course of a year, and often used as 
a measure of the president’s policy goals for that year) and media coverage of political issues 
(Gilberg et al. 1980).  Other studies have been less definitive and found mixed results, 
conditioned by time or issue area.  Wanta and his co-authors (1989), for example, found that 
two of the four presidents they studied (Carter in 1978 and Reagan in 1985) were able to 
influence media coverage of political issues through their State of the Union Addresses.  The 
other two presidents (Nixon in 1970 and Reagan in 1982) were not.18 
 In a broader study of President George Bush’s public speeches, Wanta and Foote 
(1994) found significant differences in the president’s ability to set the media’s agenda based 
on the type of issue the president was discussing.  Their research revealed that the president’s 
power was much greater in foreign policy and on pet policy matters than in economic or 
social policy (see also Peake 2001).  In contrast to other studies, Edwards and Wood (1999) 
found no evidence for the president’s ability to set the media’s agenda on issues of foreign 
policy, but found evidence that on domestic policy issues, particularly health and education, 
the president can act as a powerful agenda setter.   
 Though the results of existing analyses vary widely, it is likely that there is some truth 
to all of these findings.  The role of time and idiosyncratic factors, for example, cannot be 
ignored.  As Edwards and Wood (1999) suggest, a president’s ability to pursue his goals may 
                                                
18 Each analysis used only one year of the president’s State of the Union Address. 
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certainly be conditioned on other variables such as his time in office (honeymoon period), 
charisma, public reputation, and personal interest in serving as a policy entrepreneur.  
Agenda Setting in the Legislative Branch 
The most notable research on Congress’ ability to act as media agenda setter is the 
series of works conducted by Baumgartner and Jones (e.g. 1993, Jones and Baumgartner 
2005, Baumgartner, Jones, and Leech 1997).  In one such study, these authors use data on a 
range of issue areas from tobacco use to nuclear power to examine the relationship between 
the quantity and tone of media coverage and the quantity and tone of congressional hearings.  
They provide persuasive evidence that congressional action and media coverage are 
inextricably linked on each of these issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  Not only do 
levels of media attention to political issues and congressional attention to these issues follow 
a similar path, but the tone of media coverage and governmental attention to these issues also 
appear to mimic one another. 
The source of this relationship has been attributed in part to the representational role 
of members of Congress.  Members need to know their constituents’ positions on political 
issues, and constituents need to know what their members are doing in Washington.  This 
makes the media’s role as a linkage between the public and Congress extraordinarily 
important.   
 But, perhaps more importantly, Congress (as the law-making branch) has significant 
power to make policy and appropriate funds for nearly all policy issues that come before the 
federal government.  In other words, this institution may be naturally predisposed to act as a 
policy venue, or institution with the primary control over the course of public policy in an 
issue area, for a large number of issues.  Since, as discussed in Chapter 2, the media should 
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be more likely to cover the actions of a political institution when it acts as a policy venue, 
Congress may be predisposed to garner a great deal of media attention and therefore have 
significant ability to set the media’s agenda.  
Agenda Setting in the Judicial Branch 
Although it has rarely been brought into the policy literature, the Supreme Court’s 
ability to set the public agenda has been widely debated by scholars of judicial politics. 
Conventional wisdom, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, suggested that the U.S. Supreme 
Court played a dynamic role in putting issues on the national agenda and creating social 
change (e.g. Murphy 1964, Kluger 1976, Wasby, D’Amato, and Metrailer 1977, O’Connor 
1980). 
 Rosenberg (1991), however, has made the case that the Court is a constrained policy 
actor whose decisions have limited effects.  In a study of the Court’s ability to create social 
change, he points out that the justices are bound by their docket, the rules of the legal system, 
and the checks and balances of the American political system.  As a result, the Court is 
limited in its ability to increase media and public attention to issues; by simply deciding a 
case in a given issue area, the Court is unlikely to increase the salience of political issues.  
For example, Rosenberg shows that the highest levels of media attention to African 
Americans’ civil rights during the 1950s and 1960s came as a result of the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott (1955) and the Birmingham Demonstrations (1963), and not the Court’s landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which ordered the desegregation of public 
elementary and secondary schools.  In fact, he provides evidence that there was not even a 
significant increase in attention to civil rights issues in the days and weeks following the 
Court’s decision. 
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 In a similar analysis, Rosenberg also shows that newspaper and magazine attention to 
the abortion issue did not reach new heights after the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973), 
which overturned the abortion laws of forty-seven states.  In fact, magazine coverage of the 
abortion issue actually reached its peak in 1971, well before the Court’s ultimate decision.   
Other analyses by Rosenberg of women’s rights and the environment—issues that are much 
less constitutional (and perhaps controversial) in nature—also reveal similar trends. 
Reconsidering the Courts as Agenda Setter 
 Rosenberg’s findings paint a bleak picture for the Court’s ability to create social 
change. These facts do not change the reality that (at least in certain political circumstances) 
the judiciary should, like the executive and legislative branches, be able to act as agenda 
setter and increase the visibility of social and political issues. This ability to set the agenda 
gives the Court tremendous institutional power. 
  First, like the elected branches, the judiciary is a fully institutionalized policy actor 
(McGuire 2004).  It has all of the resources necessary to make policy pronouncements on a 
wide range of social and political issues.  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court, especially, has 
a highly professionalized public information office that is well equipped to publicize the 
policy consequences of the Court’s decisions (Greenhouse 2004).  And, scholarly indicators 
of issue salience reveal that many of the Court’s decisions do receive front-page coverage in 
major newspapers such as the New York Times (Epstein and Segal 2000). 
Second, substantial anecdotal evidence demonstrates that other institutional actors 
respond to judicial decisions; this is the essence of agenda setting.  For example, following 
the Court’s decision in the equal pay case of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company (2007), which limited the amount of time women workers had to sue for 
54 
employment discrimination, women members of Congress reignited their calls for legislation 
to ensure equal pay for women workers.  The issue was discussed frequently during the 2008 
presidential campaign.  And, following the election of a Democratic Congress and president, 
the bill was one of the first pieces of legislation Barack Obama signed as president. 
Some of the cause of Congress and the president’s response to decisions such as 
Ledbetter may owe to the fact that these actors fundamentally disagree with the policy 
position taken by the Court.  The Court may also (for example as in Brown) leave much of 
the policy implementation to the other branches, thus forcing them to respond to a particular 
judicial decision.  But, whatever the motives of the actors involved, one simple fact remains 
unchanged—by handing down a policy decision, the Court can cause other institutions (and 
often the media covering these institutions) to reallocate their issue attention and consider 
policy maters they might otherwise have ignored.  This is the essence of agenda setting. 
Third, it has been widely acknowledged (and is demonstrated again in Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation) that the publicity generated by judicial decisions is one of the main 
motivating factors for interest groups’ involvement before the courts.  As O’Connor (1980: 
5) notes, “Publicity generated by adjudication places its sponsor in the public eye and can 
provide a legitimate way for the organization to place its issue on the public agenda.”  To this 
end, organizational maintenance is cited as one of the major reasons for groups’ participation 
before the courts (O’Connor 1980, Epstein 1985, Kobylka 1987, Caldeira and Wright 1989, 
Wasby 1995).  If groups did not see some sort of return on their investment in organizational 
maintenance—likely in terms of visibility of their issue or organization—it would be unlikely 
that they would continue to devote resources to lobbying the courts.  However, interest group 
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participation before the courts is hardly on the decline, as it has increased by about 800 
percent since 1950 (Kearney and Merrill 2000, Collins 2008).   
Finally, there is the simple fact that Rosenberg’s argument may be time or issue 
bound, and, as a result, tells only part of the story.  Although he observes no immediate 
social change after the Court handed down Brown on May 17, 1954, it appears there may be 
a subtle and delayed agenda setting effect.  There is a significant increase in coverage in 
1955-56 (Rosenberg 1991: 113).  Rosenberg attributes this increase to the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott.  While this may be true, prima facie, without empirical analysis of time-serial data, 
it is hard to determine whether it was the Boycott itself that led to the spike in coverage, or if 
the Court’s decision played a role in priming the news media to look for and cover events 
such as the Boycott.19  In fact, it could also be said that, without the Court’s desegregationist 
decision in Brown, the Boycott may not have happened.  Moreover, in 1955, the Court 
handed down a second desegregation decision, Brown II, which provided the direction to 
southern states on how and when they were to desegregate—“with all deliberate speed.”  The 
more explicit directions in this case could have spurred greater grassroots discussion of civil 
rights and desegregation that the more vague Brown I could not (see McCann 1992 for an 
extended discussion of this phenomenon). 
The same can be said for the case of abortion.  Although social change on the issue 
was not immediate, media attention to the abortion issue was higher in the years following 
Roe than it was in 1973, when the case was decided.  Without more detailed analysis of the 
agenda setting process than Rosenberg provides, it is not possible to conclude that the 
Court’s decision was not at least somewhat responsible for this trend.  It may be that the 
                                                
19 Still others have suggested that the Court’s decision emboldened black southerners to contest their rights in 
the form of a boycott.  Thus, the Court’s decision was more important for its grassroots and word of mouth 
effect than its national media attention (McCann 1992). 
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effects of the Court’s decision took time to be considered in state legislatures and on the 
agendas of old and new interest groups, and that the increase in media attention in 1974 was 
due to this mobilization process. 
Variability of Judicial Power 
 Still, the Court’s ability to set the media’s agenda through its policy decisions—like 
that of the executive and legislative branches—may not be universal.  There may be some 
types of issues where the Court is simply a more significant policy actor with greater ability 
to influence ultimate policy outcomes.  Again, this brings us back to the notion of policy 
venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
In cases where the Court acts as a policy venue—usually constitutional issue areas, 
for reasons discussed in detail in Chapter 1—the Court should have greater ability to 
influence the media’s issue attention.  Because the Court’s decisions in these policy areas are 
more likely to have lasting policy implications, they are more likely to be stories that the 
media must not only cover in the immediate aftermath of the Court’s decision, but where the 
media will also follow the issue for the days and weeks following the decision.   Stories 
about the response of interest groups, legislators, the president, and even policymakers in the 
states are likely to result from the Court’s decisions in these cases.  This may help the Court 
to set the public and media agendas.20 
Hypotheses 
 This theory leads to a simple, testable hypothesis: By deciding to hear cases involving 
particular issue areas and ultimately making judgments on these matters, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, just as Congress and the president, should be able to set the media’s agenda and 
                                                
20 Of course, this pattern of media attention may also give the Court incentives to use negative agenda control 
to keep issues off their docket and the media’s agenda.  The Roberts Court, in particular, has been criticized 
under suspicion of using this very practice to avoid controversial issues and public criticism. 
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increase the salience of political issues.  Accordingly, there should be a positive relationship 
between the issue composition of the Court’s docket and the issues that receive coverage in 
the news media. 
 This agenda-setting ability should be at least somewhat conditional on issue area.  
The Court should have greater latitude in setting the media’s agenda in issue areas where it 
acts as a policy venue than in issue areas that are controlled by the legislative and/or 
executive branches.  Thus, the Court should have greater agenda setting power in those issue 
areas where it considers the greatest average percentage of constitutional cases. 
The reverse should also be true. The Court should have less latitude in setting the 
media’s agenda in issue areas where it is least likely to act as a policy venue.  Instead, the 
legislative and/or the executive branch should have greater agenda setting power in these 
issue areas. 
Data and Methods 
 To examine the relationship between institutional agendas and media coverage, I use 
time-serial data from the Policy Agendas Project.  The Policy Agendas Project is a database 
that uses a unified issue-based coding scheme to bring together data from the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of American federal government.  It also includes data on 
issue salience, measured using Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey question and New 
York Times coverage.21 
 The activities of each of the branches, as well as the information on media coverage, 
are coded using a consistent scheme.  There are nineteen major issue areas—covering things 
such as health, education, and the law—and more than two hundred sub-issue codes.  Using 
                                                
21 Times coverage in the Policy Agendas Project is a random sample of articles listed in the New York Times 
Index. 
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the same issue codes across datasets allows for easier inter-branch analysis, and is 
particularly useful for examining questions such as the one I examine here. 
 In addition to using this data to identify the issues considered by each of the political 
institutions, I use this issue data in combination with information from the Spaeth Dataset to 
determine the issue areas where the Court is most and least likely to act as a policy venue.  
To do this, I classify each case heard by the Court as constitutional/non-constitutional using 
the Spaeth “authdec” variable.  I then combine this with the Policy Agenda Project issue 
codes assigned to each case to calculate the average percentage of constitutional cases 
considered by the Court in each issue area.  These values range from 11 percent to 52 
percent.  The top five issue areas in terms of percentage constitutional cases (those 40 percent 
and over) are grouped as the policy venue issue areas for purposes of this analysis.22  These 
issue areas are macroeconomics, civil rights and liberties, education, law, and government 
operations.  The six issue areas with the lowest percentage of constitutional cases (those 20 
percent and under) are grouped as the non-policy venue issue areas.23  These issue areas are 
agriculture, labor, energy, banking, defense, and international affairs. 
Dependent Variable 
 This model is particularly concerned with examining the judiciary’s ability to put 
issues on the public agenda vis a vis the other branches of the American federal government.  
As such, the dependent variable must be an indicator of an issue’s media attention in a given 
year.  New York Times coverage has been used in a variety of other studies as a gauge of this 
visibility; I continue to use it here. 
                                                
22 I choose to use five issue areas because, with 19 total issue areas, five issues represent roughly the top and 
bottom quartiles. 
 
23 I use six issue areas here because two issue areas had identical percentages of constitutional cases. 
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 Some scholars may question the use of the New York Times as a proxy for all media 
attention.  However, repeated analyses by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005) have shown that the Times is a reasonable proxy for the issues covered 
by a range of media sources, including those listed in the Readers’ Guide to Periodical 
Literature.  In their recent book on the death penalty, moreover, Baumgartner, DeBoef, and 
Boydstun (2008) show that the quantity and tome of coverage provided by the comparatively 
liberal Times paralleled that of the more conservative Houston Chronicle. 
 Because the Times data contained in the Policy Agendas Project is a random sample 
of all coverage from a given year, and because the model makes comparisons across issues 
and time (which may have substantial variation), using a raw count of news stories is not 
workable.  Such a count would not control for variations in the total news space allotted by 
the Times over the thirty year time period included in this analysis.24  Thus, the dependent 
variable is the percentage of all news coverage in a given year allocated to a particular issue 
area. The proportion of media coverage devoted to an issue area in a year ranges from 0 
percent to 40 percent. 
Independent Variables 
 The model contains three main independent variables of interest—each one gauging 
the policy agenda of one of the three branches of the federal government.  The first of these 
variables is the variable measuring the proportion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket 
dedicated to each issue area in each year.25   It is created using a combination of Policy 
                                                
24 For example, there might be a greater number of stories on a given issue area in a given year because the 
issue was more important in that year, or it may simply be because the media published more total stories in that 
year. 
 
25 To make the data as comparable as possible, I calculate the proportion of the docket using decision dates 
rather than terms of the Court. 
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Agendas Project data and information from the Spaeth dataset.  In accordance with the 
standard practices associated with using the Spaeth dataset, I sort by case citation so as not to 
count cases more than once. The proportion of judicial decisions devoted to an issue area in a 
year ranges from 0 percent to 45 percent. 
 The second of these variables measures congressional attention to each issue area in 
each year.  I choose to use the congressional hearings data from the Policy Agendas Project, 
and again construct a proportion of all hearings devoted to each issue area. The proportion of 
congressional hearings devoted to an issue area in a year ranges from 0 percent to 18 percent. 
I could have also chosen to use public law enactments as a measure of Congress’ 
agenda setting activity.  However, I chose not to do this for several reasons.  First, I was 
concerned that this might be too narrow a measure because so few bills become law.  Second, 
a bill becoming a law can often be an endpoint for an issue’s time on the public agenda, at 
least in the short run.  It is in the deliberation and policymaking phases that Congress can 
really set the public agenda.  It is, however, worth noting that the proportions of hearings and 
public laws in a given issue area and year are correlated at .71. 
 Finally, the model includes a measure of executive branch activity.  Consistent with 
previous research that argues that the president’s main agenda-setting tool is the State of the 
Union Address, this variable measures the proportion of the president’s State of the Union 
Address devoted to each issue area in a given year.  This data is also obtained from the 
Policy Agendas Project. The proportion of a president’s State of the Union Address devoted 
to an issue area in a year ranges from 0 percent to 57 percent. 
Alternately, I could have chosen to use executive orders as a measure of the 
president’s ability to set the agenda.  However, State of the Union Addresses have been used 
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in many previous analyses of the president as agenda setter and have shown to be powerful 
indicators of a president’s policy priorities for a given year.  Moreover, few executive orders 
receive a great deal of public attention; many of these are highly procedural and do not relate 
to major policy goals.26 
Model 
 The nature of this data lends itself naturally to a time series model for panel data.  
There are nineteen issue areas for each year from 1972-2003, for a total of 608 observations.  
I choose to show the results using an ordinary least squares regression model, though the 
results remain substantively the same using a generalized least squares model. 
This model addresses a common problem in panel data, unit effects.  Unit effects are 
differences in the data that are a result of natural variations in the categories pooled to create 
a panel dataset (in this case, issue areas), and are not the result of the change of time or other 
independent variables.  It is easy to see how unit effects may be present in this data—the 
dynamics of education policy may vary dramatically from the dynamics of agriculture policy, 
which may also vary dramatically from the dynamics of civil rights laws.  To address these 
effects, I use a model with fixed effects. Fixed effects allow a researcher to model the 
specific causes of unit effects by introducing a series of dummy variables for each of the 
units but one.  The model then estimates a series of coefficients for each of the variables, 
pulling the unit effects out of the coefficients for other variables in the model.  Although 
these coefficients do not display in a computerized model, a fixed effects model is often 
employed when, as in this case, the variation between units is interesting in and of itself 
(Maddala 1971). 
                                                
26 To test the robustness of my models, I have tested alternate models using both the bills and executive orders 
variables.  Although the fit of these models is less than those using the hearings and State of the Union 
variables, the substantive results remain the same. 
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Alternately, I could have chosen to employ a random effects model to address the unit 
effects.  Instead of estimating a series of unit dummies for each of the units (as in a fixed 
effects model), a random effects model removes unit effects from the model and captures all 
of the unit effects in an error term.  This statistical technique assumes that the differences 
between the units are theoretically uninteresting stochastic variation.  Since the theory in this 
paper explicitly argues that there should be theoretically significant differences across issue 
areas (as a result of policy venues), a random effects model is inappropriate in this case.  
Findings 
 The findings shown in Table 3.1 clearly reveal that the judiciary does, indeed, play a 
role as an agenda setter.27  This role is significant across all issue areas, although the courts 
have the greatest relative institutional power in cases where the court is most likely to act as a 
policy venue.  Interestingly, the president’s State of the Union Address does not appear to 
influence media coverage in any of the issue combinations. Consider each of these models 
separately. 
 In the model of all nineteen issue areas (shown in the first results column of Table 
3.1), congressional hearings clearly have the largest substantive effect.  As shown in Figure 
3.1, increasing the proportion of congressional hearings devoted to an issue area from its 
minimum to maximum increases media attention to that issue area by about 8 percent.  This 
is more than a standard deviation increase in the media coverage variable.28  This effect 
suggests a powerful connection between the congressional agenda and the issues that the 
media covers and citizens consider. 
                                                
27 To be as certain as possible about the direction of this relationship, I also did a test of Granger causality.  The 
test was significant at three lags, F=3.07, p=.02.  It can be said that judicial attention to issues Granger causes 
media attention. 
 
28 The Times variable has a standard deviation of .07. 
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 Judicial decisions also have a substantively significant effect.  Increasing the 
proportion of judicial decisions devoted to an issue area from its minimum to its maximum 
increases media attention to that issue by about 4.5 percent.  Although this effect is not as 
large as that observed for Congress, it is still speaks to a significant—and previously 
unclear—role of the Court as media agenda setter. 
 The executive branch, however, lacks similar agenda setting power.  Increasing the 
proportion of the president’s State of the Union Address devoted to an issue from its 
minimum to maximum level only increases media attention by 1.5 percent.  This effect is 
statistically and substantively insignificant.  Such a finding is consistent with previous 
research, which has struggled to find a consistent presidential agenda setting effect, 
particularly using State of the Union Addresses (e.g. Gilberg, McCombs, and Nicholas 1980, 
Wanta 1989, Edwards and Wood 1999). 
The Court as a Likely Policy Venue 
 Recall the secondary hypothesis that the Court’s agenda setting ability should vary 
with issue area.  Specifically, the Court should have greater ability to affect media coverage 
when it acts as a policy venue.  The previously identified Policy Agendas Project issue areas 
where this is most likely to be the case are macroeconomics, civil rights and liberties, 
education, law, and government operations. 
 The empirical analysis reveals that the Court’s agenda setting role is, indeed, 
magnified in these issue areas (shown in the second results column of Table 3.1).  The 
absolute size of the increase in the proportion of coverage is modest—the maximum change 
in coverage that is the result of the judicial docket increases from 4.5 percent in the full 
model to 5.4 percent in the policy venues model.  But, in relative terms, the Court’s agenda 
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setting impact vis a vis the legislature is now nearly equal, as revealed in Figure 3.2.  
Although the legislature was able to increase media attention by 8 percent in the full model, 
in the policy venue model, I observe only a 5.9 percent increase in media coverage over the 
range of the legislative variable. 
 Again, I find no evidence for the role of the president as agenda setter.  This model 
actually predicts a negative (albeit insignificant) relationship between presidential attention 
and media coverage.  Thus, it appears that if the president is able to act as an agenda setter in 
any issue area it is not the ones where the Court acts as a policy venue. 
The Court as an Unlikely Policy Venue 
 The hypotheses further predict that the Court’s agenda setting power should be much 
lower in issue areas where it does not act as a policy venue.  Because of the largely statutory 
nature of many of these issue areas, the elected branches should play a much larger role in 
setting the media’s agenda.  The unlikely policy venue issues from the Policy Agendas 
Project considered here are agriculture, labor, energy, banking, defense, and international 
affairs. 
 The significantly decreased role of the judiciary as agenda setter in these issues is 
readily apparent in Figure 3.3 and the third column of Table 3.1.  As the figure reveals, the 
judicial agenda has a statistically and substantively insignificant effect on media coverage of 
these issues.  Over the range of the judicial variable, media attention changes by less than 1 
percent. 
 Interestingly, executive branch attention to issues also remains an insignificant 
predictor of media coverage.  Media attention changes by only about 1 percent over the range 
of the State of the Union variable.  Legislative attention, however, is another story.  Over the 
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range of the legislative variable, media attention to issues changes by about 13 percent.  This 
likely owes to the highly statutory nature of these issues, and may suggest that the legislature 
actually acts as a policy venue for at least some of these matters.  Accordingly, the media is 
even more reliant upon legislative attention to determine coverage of these issues. 
Discussion 
 The preceding models provide evidence that the judiciary can act as an agenda setter 
for the media, and, therefore, that the types of cases the Court decides to decide affect the 
types of political issues the general public is exposed to through news coverage.  These 
effects are particularly important in issue areas where the Court is more likely to act as a 
policy venue.  This assigns to the judiciary a much greater role as agenda setter than is 
typically assumed, both in the judicial politics literature and in the public policy literature. 
 This ability to put issues on the media’s agenda has a number of potential 
consequences.  First, putting issues on the media’s agenda is one way for the judiciary to 
reach out to the public to raise the public’s knowledge of and interest in political issues that 
the Court deems important.  This can be an essential part of the Court’s actions to maintain 
institutional prestige, and can also be a way for the Court to use public pressure to help build 
support for judicial decisions that it cannot enforce on its own. 
 Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, this is a two-way street. The Court can also 
attempt to keep issues off the media and public agendas by choosing not to adjudicate cases 
on those issues.  Particularly in issue areas where the Court acts as a policy venue, its ability 
to set the media’s agenda is nearly as great as that of Congress.  Thus, an exercise of negative 
agenda control can have sweeping effects in limiting public knowledge and interest.  In fact, 
since the Court considers such a small number of cases in an average year (75-80 of the 
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10,000 cases presented to it in recent years), we might actually expect that the Court’s 
negative agenda control is more significant than its ability to put issues on the agenda by 
deciding to decide particular cases. 
 Second, by deciding cases that put issues on the public agenda, the Court may compel 
other institutional actors to consider policies related to issues that they would rather avoid (or 
to make polices different from their ideal).  For example, if the Court decides to take a case 
related to enforcement of the Equal Pay Act, it is likely that its decision will have cascading 
consequences for the workload, priorities, and regulations implemented by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission; if this decision receives significant public attention, 
the pressure to implement regulations consistent with public opinion will be much greater.  
Similarly, when the Court hands down a decision on abortion, it is not uncommon to see 
members of Congress and the state legislatures refocusing their attention on the abortion 
issue and introducing relevant new legislation.29 
 The ability to cause actors in other institutions to pay attention to issues they might 
otherwise ignore is a fundamental part of the American political system.  Yet, for much of 
the Court’s history, the other branches paid little attention to many of its decisions.  The fact 
that the Court can put issues in the public eye and attempt to compel other actors to respond 
to its actions is a significant power for the Court.30   
 Third, this cascade of power and influence may also extend to interest groups and 
other non-institutional actors (e.g. political parties).  By deciding cases that increase the 
visibility of political issues, the Court may create windows of opportunity that inspire the 
                                                
29 Testing this hypothesis using the existing Policy Agendas Project data is not possible; abortion is one of the 
issue areas where Policy Agendas Project data is not particularly useable.  To test this hypothesis, I would have 
to collect separate data on media coverage of the abortion issue. 
 
30 Admittedly, this power is conditional and relies on a number of other political circumstances. 
67 
creation of new interest groups (Kingdon 1995).  It may also lead existing groups to 
reallocate resources to lobbying on or addressing new and different political issues.  For 
example, the growth in women’s rights litigation in the 1970s prompted the creation of a 
number of public interest law firms designed to work alongside and in cooperation with the 
American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project. 
Returning to Rosenberg 
 The evidence regarding the Court’s ability to set the media’s agenda merits a return to 
Rosenberg’s (1991) arguments.  Recall that Rosenberg argued that the Court was a relatively 
powerless actor because its decisions did not lead to immediate changes in public policy and 
media attention.  Yet, this analysis shows that, when we consider broad issue areas and 
longer periods of time, the general composition of the Court’s docket does, indeed, affect the 
types of issues covered by the media.  When the Court talks more about civil rights and 
liberties, for example, the media follows suit.  Thus, although the Court’s power to create 
social change is subtler than Rosenberg expected, it is not non-existent; the Court is not a 
totally hollow hope.   
For example, if we consider the immediate effects of one judicial decision, we may 
see no social change.  But, if we look at the broader policy agenda over the course of several 
years, we may see a slow course of change beginning with the Court’s decision that provides 
the real evidence of judicial power in the policymaking process.  Roe v. Wade (1973) was not 
even the lead news story the day after it was decided—January 23.31  And, although news 
coverage of the issue in 1973 did not reach the high water mark established in 1971, 
Rosenberg observed an increase in attention to the abortion issue in the media between 1973 
                                                
31 Former President Lyndon B. Johnson died on January 22, 1973 and was the top news story on January 23. 
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and 1974.32  In addition, in the seven years after Roe, eight major pro-life groups as well as 
countless national, state, and local affiliates came on to the scene.33  These groups sponsored 
litigation campaigns, organized marches and rallies, and lobbied state and federal legislators.   
Many of these groups were also instrumental in working with federal legislators and 
President Gerald R. Ford to gain approval of the Hyde Amendment, which restricted the use 
of federal funds for abortions under the Medicaid program.  This is most certainly an issue 
that the elected branches would not have devoted attention to if the Court had not handed 
down Roe.  Similar processes, moreover, played out over the next few years in the forty-
seven state legislatures whose statutes had been invalidated by the Court’s decision.  Pro-life 
legislators sponsored legislation and lobbied for the passage of new statutes designed to test 
the boundaries of the Court’s new decision. 
 A number of these state statutes, as well as the Hyde Amendment, ended up before 
the Supreme Court in the early 1980s and beyond.  The Court’s willingness to hear and 
decide these cases (many of which were sponsored by interest groups such as NARAL) kept 
the abortion issue on the agenda,34 and set off another trip around the policymaking cycle.  It 
would, in fact, be little exaggeration to say that one of the major litmus tests and 
                                                
32 It may also be that some of the spike in attention to the abortion issue observed by Rosenberg in 1971 was 
due to the fact that the Court granted certiorari to Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton in that year.  Many observers 
forget the extended period of time (and the two oral arguments) that it took for the Court to hand down its 
decision in this case. 
 
33 These groups were the National Committee for a Human Life Amendment (1974), the National Right to Life 
Committee (1974), the National Conference of Catholic Bishops Congressional Conference Committees (1975), 
Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund (1976), the National Pro-Life Political Action Committee 
(1977), the Life Amendment Political Action Committee (1977), the Moral Majority (1979), and the Pro-Life 
Action League (1980).  Notably, many of these groups had ties to the Catholic Church—one group who took 
note of the Court’s decision in Roe almost immediately. 
 
34 Moreover, 1980 marked the first time that both major political parties discussed the abortion issue in their 
platforms.  This opened the door to further politicization of the issue, such as that seen during the recent partial 
birth abortion debates. 
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battlegrounds for political conflict today would never exist if the Court had not decided Roe 
in 1973.  There is little more that can be said to demonstrate the power of the Court in putting 
and maintaining issues on the political agenda. 
Congress as Agenda Setter 
 It is, of course, also worth noting the power of Congress as an agenda-setter.  It 
should be unsurprising that the issues that appear on the congressional agenda also become 
issues that receive attention in the news media.  This finding is consistent with earlier 
research by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, Jones and Baumgartner 2005) and is essential to 
maintaining the representational linkage between members of Congress and members of the 
general public.  In fact, given this linkage, it would be more surprising, and perhaps even 
troubling, if there was no connection between the issues discussed by the peoples’ branch 
and media coverage.  Given the perpetual campaign, members’ need to attract publicity, and 
citizens’ interest in the implications of these policies, it seems this is a natural connection. 
The even greater power of Congress to set the agenda in issue areas where the Court 
does not act as a policy venue is also noteworthy.  These issue areas—many of them 
statutory in nature, are frequently discussed and regulated by Congress.  For many of these 
issues, it can probably be said that Congress has at least some of the powers of a policy 
venue. 
Congress, for example, has tremendous power to regulate and authorize spending on 
issues such as agriculture, defense, and international affairs.  Agricultural subsidies, for 
example, are a subject of major contention in many areas of the country and one reason why 
seats on Congress’ agriculture committees are so desirable to many members.  When 
Congress devotes attention to or considers changing these policies, it should be no surprise 
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that the media responds accordingly.  Similarly, although many matters of defense and 
international affairs are handled on a day-to-day basis by the executive branch Departments 
of State and Defense, Congress plays a major role in activities such as funding war and 
national defense and imposing sanctions.  Once again, these are decisions that have a 
significant national policy impact and are of concern to many Americans.  Thus, when 
Congress considers these issues it should follow that media coverage responds accordingly. 
The Executive Branch as Agenda Setter 
 The consistent lack of significance for the president’s State of the Union Address in 
setting the media’s agenda is also quite notable.  Though the president may be able to take 
some policy actions or work with Congress to put issues of particularly broad or narrow 
appeal on the public agenda, it appears that, during the course of day-to-day business, the 
president’s agenda setting power is somewhat limited.  This may confirm the suspicions of 
other scholars who view the presidency as a largely reactive institution and regard the 
president’s policy priorities to be determined more by necessity than personal priority (e.g. 
Edwards 1989, Jones 1994, 1995).35 
Conclusion 
This chapter uses data from the Policy Agendas Project to examine whether the 
agenda of the U.S. Supreme Court influences the issues that receive coverage in the media.  
Using a time-series cross-sectional model, it demonstrates that the judgments made by the 
judiciary, do, indeed influence the issues that are covered in the media; the relationship 
between the judicial agenda and media coverage even surpasses the relationship between the 
executive branch’s policy priorities and media attention.  The individual issue area also 
                                                
35 This, incidentally, may be consistent with the Framers’ intentions in crafting the executive office. 
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affects this relationship, with the Court’s agenda setting power being even greater in areas 
where it acts as a policy venue. 
 Taken together with Chapter 2, this chapter has provided substantial evidence for the 
ability of the courts to act as agenda setters and to influence the activities of non-institutional 
policy actors.  Even without the purse or the sword, the courts can influence the way that 
issues are portrayed in the media.  This is a significant power for the courts.  First, it gives 
the judiciary significant control of how its business is portrayed in the public, which may 
allow the courts to retain and gain institutional prestige.  Second, this ability to act as agenda 
setter may compel other institutional and quasi-institutional actors—at least in some issue 
areas—to address policy questions they might have otherwise avoided.  
 The next two chapters explore the courts’ influence on another quasi-institutional 
political actor, interest groups.  Chapter 4 embarks on an exploration of how the types of 
cases decided by the courts influence interest groups’ allocations of resources within the 
judiciary.  Chapter 5 takes a broader perspective, examining how the composition of the 
Court’s docket influences groups’ lobbying strategies across branches, specifically the 
judiciary and the legislature. 
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Figure 3.1. Institutional Effects on Media Attention, All Issues 
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Figure 3.2. Institutional Effects on Media Attention, Policy Venue Issues 
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Figure 3.3. Institutional Effects on Media Attention, Non-Policy Venue Issues 
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Table 3.1. Predictors of Media Attention to Political Issues 
 All Issues  Policy Venue Issues 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
Congressional 
Hearings 
.47 
(.09) 
***  .33 
(.18) 
** 
Judicial 
Decisions 
.11 
(.06) 
**  .12 
(.04) 
*** 
Presidential  
State of Union 
.02 
(.02) 
  -.01 
(.02) 
 
F 12.37 ***  4.79 *** 
R
2
overall .24   .46  
 .85   .34  
N 608   160  
 
**Significant at p < .05 (one-tailed)  
***Significant at p < .01 (one-tailed) 
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
EXPLAINING HOW COURTS INFLUENCE INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION AS 
AMICUS CURIAE
 
Judicial politics scholars know much about the types of groups that participate before 
the judiciary, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, how much they participate, and the forms 
this participation takes.  We do not, however, fully understand how courts’ dockets affect 
interest group participation before the judiciary or how this participation affects lobbying in 
other branches.  These questions are the focus of the next two chapters of this dissertation.   
This chapter examines how the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket 
affects interest groups’ lobbying activities as amicus curiae.  I expect that, even after 
controlling for the other factors that may affect interest group participation before the 
judiciary, more briefs should be filed in cases where the Court’s decisions help interest 
groups to serve their long-term goals of influencing public policy and organizational 
maintenance. The analyses find support for this hypothesis and begin to demonstrate that the 
judiciary’s agenda does, in fact, influence the attention paid to it by organized interests.  
Theoretical Foundation 
 As I have argued in previous chapters, the judiciary’s ability to shape the agendas of 
other policy actors hinges, in part, on the composition of its docket.   Some cases are 
particularly alluring to other actors in the policy system, including the media and interest 
groups, while other cases are merely procedural or affect such a small class of citizens that 
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they seem inconsequential.  Among the types of cases that should increase the courts’ 
agenda-setting power are those where the courts are more likely to influence public policy, 
and salient cases such as those discussed in Chapter 2, which attract high amounts of media 
and public attention.  Considering cases that fit these criteria may affect the activities of a 
range of policy actors, but the effects of these cases are particularly interesting for interest 
groups.  Salient cases and cases where the courts can influence public policy map neatly onto 
the primary goals of many types of organized interests in the political system. 
 The following paragraphs detail groups’ decisions to turn to the courts.  They then 
consider the goals groups attempt to achieve through participation and the resource 
limitations faced by these policy actors.  This section concludes with a note on what courts 
gain by attracting group participation. 
Interest Group Participation Before the Courts 
Groups, particularly those who are somehow disadvantaged in the electoral branches, 
have chosen to turn to the courts to achieve social and political change for at least 150 years 
(Bentley 1908, Truman 1951, Vose 1957, 1959, Cortner 1968).  Many of these early groups 
who turned to the judiciary chose to pursue test-case litigation strategies, wherein group 
lawyers or their active members guided a series of cases through the legal system in an 
attempt to achieve incremental change in public policy. This strategy is most commonly 
identified with the lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, who used 
test-case litigation with great success in desegregating education and housing in the mid-
twentieth century (Vose 1957, 1959, 1972).  Women’s rights activists also used test-case 
litigation in their attempt to elevate gender to a suspect classification (O’Connor 1980).  And, 
today, lawyers in a variety of states continue to pursue similar strategies in attempt to legalize 
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gay marriage (O’Connor and Yanus 2007). 
While case sponsorship allows significant control over the course of litigation, it is 
time-consuming, costly, and requires great expertise.  Thus, most groups who participate 
before the judiciary choose to do so by filing amicus curiae (or friend of the court) briefs or 
joining amicus curiae briefs written by other organizations.  Such participation is very 
common, and there are few cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court today that do not have 
amicus curiae participation (Kearney and Merrill 2000, Owens and Epstein 2005, Collins 
2008).  Amicus participation is also increasing in state and lower federal courts (e.g. 
Martinek 2006). 
Incentives for Group Participation 
 Scholars have highlighted two particularly important reasons why groups choose to 
turn to the courts.  The first of these reasons is influencing public policy (Epstein and 
Rowland 1991, Hansford 2004, Solberg and Waltenburg 2006).  The second is organizational 
maintenance (Wilson 1973, Salisbury 1984, Kobylka 1987, Caldeira and Wright 1989, 
Wasby 1995).  Achieving both of these goals is essential for the survival of groups in the 
political system. 
Participation to Influence Public Policy 
Influencing policy outcomes is perhaps the primary goal of many groups that 
participate before the courts (Epstein and Rowland 1991, Hansford 2004, Solberg and 
Waltenburg 2006).  Although groups may lobby the judiciary to affect public policy in a 
broad range of cases, constitutional cases may provide groups with particularly good 
opportunities to pursue this goal.  As I have found in previous chapters, the courts are more 
likely to act as policy venues in these cases.  Therefore, the Court’s decisions are also more 
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likely to have a lasting effect on policy in constitutional cases. 
This may mean that groups acting as case sponsors have significant incentives to 
frame particular types of cases as constitutional cases if they have the option to do so.  A 
decision by the Court in a constitutional case is often a solid platform for long-term lobbying 
efforts, especially as the group defends the precedent in lower federal and state courts and the 
other branches.  Furthermore, as will be discussed later (and was discussed in Chapter 2), 
constitutional cases might also provide better opportunities to attract media coverage and 
therefore engage in organizational maintenance. 
Most organized interest participation before the Court, however come not through 
sponsorship but through amicus curiae briefs.  Previous research has found that groups use 
amicus curiae briefs in an attempt to affect Supreme Court policy outcomes in several ways. 
One study divides these effects into two major categories: 1) an informational role; and, 2) a 
signaling role (Flango, Bross, and Corbally 2006).  Informationally, interest groups may see 
amicus briefs as an opportunity to move beyond the issues highlighted in the party briefs. 
This may consist of providing the Court with unique information congruent with the group’s 
ideal policy preferences or it may consist of providing the Court with additional, often more 
ideological, information about the potential consequences of its decision (Flango, Bross, and 
Corbally 2006). 
Spriggs and Wahlbeck (1997) have examined the informational role of amicus curiae 
in substantial detail. They find that more than 60 percent of amicus briefs filed before the 
Court during its 1992 term contained information not discussed in the party briefs; a quarter 
of these briefs contained only new information. Although the justices did not frequently cite 
briefs that contained solely unique information, the predicted probability of an argument 
80 
being adopted from a brief that blended information from party briefs with additional data 
was more than 60 percent (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997).  
More recently, Collins (2007, 2008) has explored how the information provided by 
amicus briefs affects justices’ decision-making processes.  He finds that the effects of 
information provided by these briefs are quite far reaching.  Specifically, he provides 
evidence that amicus briefs can alter justices’ votes, justices’ decisions to join or author 
opinions, and ultimately, case outcomes.   
The second role of amicus briefs, that of a signal to the Court, is also significant.  At 
the certiorari stage, justices may be uncertain about which cases most merit review. One or 
more amicus briefs may help to amplify the significance of a case.  This solves an 
information problem for the justices by informing them about a case’s public or political 
intrigue, as well as citizens’ opinions on these concerns.   Caldeira and Wright (1988) 
provide further evidence that cases supported by one or more amicus brief at certiorari are 
more likely than other similar cases to be granted review. 
Participation and Organizational Maintenance 
 Members of Congress, having been elected to the federal legislature, quickly realize 
that if they want to secure long-term policy change, their actions must be geared toward 
winning re-election (Mayhew 1974).  Accordingly, members hold town hall meetings, send 
press releases, perform constituent service and engage in a number of other activities 
designed to help them maintain their seat.  These activities may also stave off future 
challenges and help incumbents to build support among their constituency. 
 Interest groups are little different from these legislators in that they must take actions 
to assure their survival in the political system so that they can continue to lobby for policy 
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change.  This broad class of activities designed to promote interest groups’ survival is 
generally referred to as organizational maintenance and includes activities such as garnering 
publicity, credit claiming and attracting the attention (and money) of old and new members 
or constituents (Wilson 1973, Salisbury 1984, Kobylka 1987, Caldeira and Wright 1989, 
Wasby 1995). 
In a survey of interest groups participating before the Supreme Court during its 1982 
term, Caldeira and Wright (1989) find substantial evidence that organizational maintenance 
is a motivating factor behind at least some groups’ participation before the Court.  More than 
30 percent of business, trade, and professional organizations, for example, responded that 
filing an amicus brief was very important to “keeping their members happy.”  Almost 40 
percent of groups said that such participation was essential to avoiding conflict among the 
organization’s constituent base. 
Groups can engage in organizational maintenance activities in connection with any 
Supreme Court case.  But, like legislators who strive to take a position and play a key role on 
important legislation, interest groups may be particularly effective at pursuing organizational 
maintenance in salient cases (Hansford 2004).  Constituents are more likely to be aware of 
these visible issues, and thus groups can more easily mobilize, fundraise, and garner praise 
and targeted contributions. 
Limited Resources and the Costs of Participation 
 Importantly, a group’s ability to participate before the judiciary in general, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court in particular, is bounded by a number of factors, including its limited 
financial and human resources.  Financial resources may pose the most significant obstacle to 
many groups, who must pay filing fees and hire legal experts (either in-house or at an outside 
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law firm) to research and write amicus briefs. Although these costs can be difficult to 
estimate, they are substantial. In their survey of more than 500 interest groups, Caldeira and 
Wright (1989), for example, found that groups spent between $500 and $50,000 to file a brief 
before the Court. The mean amount spent was roughly $8,000. Importantly, these figures are 
more than twenty years old, and costs have inevitably increased in that time.36  
 Groups wishing to participate before the Court may also incur a human cost when 
they have to divert some of their often limited staff resources from lobbying the legislative or 
executive branches or the groups’ day-to-day activities to focus on the judiciary.  Using a 
Supreme Court case as an opportunity for organizational maintenance, for example, requires 
press releases, member contact, and other public relations events.  Organizing these events 
and activities can take away from the group’s pre-existing goals and activities in lobbying the 
other branches.  This need to reallocate resources can pose a significant obstacle to many 
groups’ full involvement before the Court.  
The extent of an interest group’s resource limitations when lobbying the courts may 
depend upon the type of group.  Some groups, such as public interest law firms, generally 
have extensive in-house legal staffs whose sole responsibility is to follow litigation and write 
briefs on matters of interest to the group.  These groups most likely have lower costs for 
filing an amicus brief than groups that do not have the same personnel and resources.  
Similarly, other types of groups, such as corporations, may have such large litigation budgets 
and be less concerned with organizational maintenance, lowering the cost of lobbying the 
Court.   But, on the other hand, many citizen or public interest groups have minute litigation 
budgets and limited personnel resources, which leave little room for additional expenditures. 
                                                
36 Some groups may receive substantial assistance in funding litigation campaigns from major law firms 
looking to do pro bono work.  But, even this comes at a cost—group leaders must meet with attorneys, publicize 
involvement, and spend time identifying related cases. 
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Thus, although some groups will inevitably be one-shotters before the Court, for 
many organized interests, making the commitment to lobby the judiciary may be a long-term 
strategic decision.  Groups interested in issues that come before the Court frequently may 
choose to specialize in judicial lobbying and even establish public-interest law firms.  This 
dedication of resources, however, may come at the expense of lobbying the legislative or 
executive branches.  Whether such a dedication of resources exists, as well as the 
consequences of such a decision for public policy, are considered in greater detail in Chapter 
5. 
Judicial Perspectives on Group Participation 
As the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated, interest groups can gain significant 
benefits from lobbying the judiciary.  However, this is not a one-sided relationship.  The 
courts and the judges who sit on these tribunals stand to gain substantial knowledge and 
insight from attracting the attention and input of organized interests.  Accordingly, they take 
a number of actions that encourage group participation before the judiciary.   First, justices 
on a court with discretionary jurisdiction may make it known, either by public 
pronouncement or through their decisions, that they are interested in adjudicating certain 
political issues.   For example, in the l870s, Chief Justice Salmon Chase notably suggested to 
women’s rights activists that they should test the boundaries of the newly ratified Fourteenth 
Amendment to determine whether its provisions extended to sex discrimination (O’Connor 
1980).  What followed was a series of cases, including Bradwell v. Illinois (1873) and Minor 
v. Happersett (1875), which did exactly that.37 
Second, the rules of many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, encourage the 
                                                
37 Unfortunately, these cases reached the Court after Chase’s death, and it would be nearly 100 years before the 
Fourteenth Amendment was extended in this way. 
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participation of interested parties through the filing of amicus curiae briefs.  The high Court’s 
Rule 37.1, for example, states, “An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the 
Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of 
considerable help to the Court.” 
A visible example of the utility of these briefs is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mapp v. Ohio (1961).  The case originally was presented to the Court as a First Amendment 
case dealing with obscenity.  But, the American Civil Liberties Union’s amicus brief 
suggested that it should be a Fourth Amendment case.  The justices ultimately heeded this 
suggestion, and the Court’s decision in Mapp went on to develop the exclusionary rule, one 
of the most frequently used regulations governing the admission of evidence in American 
criminal courts. 
Finally, continually adjudicating cases that pose salient questions and attract interest 
group participation may also serve another larger goal for judges and justices.  Cases such as 
these raise the visibility of the courts—and by extension, can affect the judiciary’s 
institutional prestige. Although the U.S. Supreme Court, especially, sometimes appears as 
though it is actively avoiding press coverage, the institution still needs to maintain a certain 
degree of public visibility if it intends to have any institutional power as a policymaker.   
Attracting the attention of interest groups who place the Court’s decisions at the center of 
their lobbying activities may be a potential solution to this problem, especially with respect 
to its standing vis a vis the legislative and executive branches. 
Hypotheses 
The preceding theory leads to a number of expectations related to how the 
composition of judicial dockets should affect interest group participation before the Court.  
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These expectations can be divided into the central hypotheses, which focus on the primary 
independent variables of interest, and the auxiliary hypotheses, which focus on other factors 
that may affect interest group participation before the Court. 
Central Hypotheses 
As the preceding pages demonstrate, groups participate before the courts for two 
primary reasons: to influence public policy and to engage in organizational maintenance.  
Accordingly, by hearing cases that allow groups to achieve these goals more or less easily, 
the Court should alter interest groups’ agendas and resource allocations.38      
One way to measure a case’s potential for influencing public policy in a case is to 
look at the issue area of the case presented to the Court.  Because the Court is more likely to 
act as a policy venue in constitutional cases, it should also be more able to influence the 
course of public policy in these cases.  Interest groups should respond to this reality and more 
briefs should be filed in constitutional cases than their statutory counterparts.   
Interest groups are also inspired by organizational maintenance.  As has been argued 
elsewhere, this activity is made easier in salient cases, which by definition generate media 
attention (and most likely public knowledge of an issue area) for a group.39 Therefore, more 
groups should participate in salient cases than their less-salient counterparts.  
Auxiliary Hypotheses 
 Other case characteristics may also affect interest groups’ choice to participate before 
the Court.  These have been thoroughly examined by many scholars, but are also worth 
noting here.  They include the participation of the U.S. government, both as party and amicus 
                                                
38 This should be particularly true for groups that do not traditionally turn to the courts, though the data to test 
such a hypothesis are not presently available. 
 
39 As I discuss later, there may be some endogenity in this relationship. 
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curiae. 
First, volumes of research have documented the success of the solicitor general before 
the U.S. Supreme Court (e.g. Puro 1971, Salokar 1992, Pacelle 2003).  The U.S. government 
as a party is not only more likely to have its cases accepted by the Court, but is also more 
likely to win than other types of litigants.  The participation of the U.S. government as a 
party, therefore, may be a disincentive for interest groups to participate before the Supreme 
Court.  Except in extraordinary circumstances, groups who agree with the government’s 
position may conclude that their interests have been protected and direct limited resources 
elsewhere.  Groups who disagree with the U.S. government may follow a similar logic, 
choosing not to waste time and money in a losing battle. 
On the other hand, the presence of the solicitor general as amicus curiae may be an 
added incentive for groups to participate before the Court (Hansford 2004).  The solicitor 
general’s participation often signals a case of political importance, and may be an excellent 
opportunity for groups to engage in organizational maintenance while also (sometimes) 
influencing public policy.  Thus, more interest group briefs should be filed in cases where the 
solicitor general also files an amicus brief.  
Data and Methods 
These analyses are conducted using data on amicus participation originally collected 
by Kearney and Merrill (2000) and updated by Collins (2008).  This dataset contains counts 
of all amicus briefs filed in all cases before the Court from 1946-2001.40  Because I merge 
this data with Baird’s combined Phase I and II of the Spaeth Dataset (Baird 2007), I am only 
                                                
40 This includes briefs filed at certiorari and on the merits.  I am not concerned that this inclusion compromises 
my theory because briefs filed at certiorari constitute relatively small percentages of all briefs and briefs filed in 
a particular case.  
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able to use all cases from 1953-2001 in my analysis.41  This still yields a total of more than 
5,000 cases.42  
Dependent Variable 
 The simplest dependent variable that could be employed in a study of this nature is a 
count of the number of briefs filed in each of the cases heard by the Court during this time 
period.  However, such a variable is problematic because it so obviously trends upward.  This 
trend has been well documented in the literature (e.g. Kearney and Merrill 2000, Owens and 
Epstein 2005).  Groups’ increasing success in the courts, as well as the growth of the interest 
group state in the 1970s led more interest groups to explore lobbying the Court as an avenue 
of political influence. 
For purposes of illustration, Figure 4.1 shows the average number of briefs per case 
received by the Court in each year of this study.43  It is evident that this line displays a 
decidedly positive trend, with the average number of briefs per case growing by between six 
and eight briefs from 1946 to 2001.  To remove this trend from the data, I create a dependent 
variable that is best described as the deviation between the number of briefs filed in a given 
case and the mean number of briefs filed in all cases decided during the same term.44  So, for 
example, if ten amicus curiae briefs were filed in a given case, and the average number of 
                                                
41 The data used were compiled from a variety of sources funded by the National Science Foundation by 
Vanessa A. Baird at the University of Colorado at Boulder, and were distributed through the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear 
any responsibility for the analysis reported here. 
 
42 This number is also the result of filtering by case citation and including only those cases that were orally 
argued before the Court. 
 
43 Reliable data on the total number of groups (filers and co-signers) is not available for this time frame. 
 
44 To construct this variable, I do not include the participation of the solicitor general, as these briefs will be 
considered as their own independent variable. 
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briefs per case for that year was 2.2, the dependent variable would take on a value of 7.8.  As 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates, this transformation removes much of the time-bound element 
present in the original data, and allows for much greater comparability across all years 
included in the dataset.45  This variable is also useful for the purposes of this analysis because 
the primary phenomenon of interest is how groups allocate their resources across cases in a 
given year; a deviation taps this construct exactly. 
 Over the more than fifty years included in this analysis, the average mean deviation 
was essentially 0.  The highest deviation, 72.94 briefs, came in the 1989 case of Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, 46 which set records for interest group participation at the 
time.47  The lowest deviation, -6.9 briefs, came in the nine cases decided in 1999 where there 
was no amicus curiae participation.48 
Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variables of interest in each of these models relate to the 
issue area and the salience of the case.  The first of these variables is a dummy variable that 
determines whether or not a case concerns a constitutional issue.  It is derived from the U.S. 
Supreme Court Judicial Database (also known as the Spaeth Dataset).  Specifically, the 
Spaeth Dataset’s “authdec” variable is used to separate constitutional decisions from other 
                                                
45 After observing the greater variation in averages in recent years as compared to earlier years, I decided to test 
another model that used the average standard deviation of the briefs as the dependent variable.  The results of 
this model were substantively the same. 
 
46 Seventy-eight briefs were filed in this case.  The Court did not receive more briefs in a single case until the 
2003 cases of Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger (the University of Michigan affirmative action cases). 
 
47 Examples of other cases with particularly high deviations—and thus particularly high levels of interest group 
participation—include the 1978 affirmative action decision of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
(50.83) and the 1997 assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg (45.92) and Vacco v. Quill (40.92). 
  
48 Because the data is skewed to the positive side, I reran the models several times excluding higher values on 
the dependent variable.  Both statistically and substantively results of the model were similar. 
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decisions of the Court.  Cases are coded 1 if they concern constitutional issues and 0 
otherwise. Overall, 34 percent of decisions included in the analysis concerned constitutional 
issues. 
Second, the salience of a case is measured using the Congressional Quarterly (CQ) 
indicator.   This information is obtained from the Supreme Court Compendium, 4th ed. 
(Epstein et al. 2006b). A case is considered salient and coded as 1 if CQ deemed it a legally 
important decision.   All other cases are considered non-salient and are coded as 0.  Overall, 
6 percent of cases included in the analysis were salient.49 
While it may be more customary in the political science literature to use the New York 
Times indicator of salience derived by Epstein and Segal (2000), it is not necessarily 
appropriate in this case. Because the Times variable is generated based on news coverage 
after the decision—and thus after groups’ decisions to participate—the measure may be an 
endogenous gauge of participation.   That is, the Times might choose to cover certain cases 
simply because of the presence of so many amicus curiae.  To avoid questions about these 
issues, I show the models using the Congressional Quarterly salience measure, which is not 
as directly dependent on interest group activity.50 
Control Variables 
 Three additional variables are also included in the model.  These controls account for 
other factors that could affect the level of interest group participation in Supreme Court 
cases.   These are the participation of the U.S. government, both as a party and as amicus 
                                                
49 Some readers may be concerned about the collinearity of salience and constitutional cases. Statistically 
speaking, however, this is not a concern; the variables only correlate at .20. 
 
50 For exploratory purposes, I tested the model with the Times measure of salience.  All of the variables yielded 
the same substantive results on all variables of interest. 
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curiae, and the ideological orientation of the Supreme Court.  
The first variable measures whether the U.S. government was a party to the case.  
This variable is taken from the Collins dataset’s “usparty” variable.  It is coded 1 if the U.S. 
government was a party to the case and 0 otherwise.  The U.S. government was a party in 22 
percent of cases included in this analysis. 
Second, the model includes a variable that measures the participation of the U.S. 
government as amicus curiae.  This variable is derived from the “sgamicus” variable in the 
Collins dataset.  It is coded 1 if the U.S. government participated as amicus curiae and 0 
otherwise.  The U.S. government participated as amicus curiae in 20 percent of cases. 
 Finally, the model includes a measure of judicial ideology.51 This variable is added as 
a control and is intended to assure that the political environment of the Court does not affect 
interest group activity.52  This is an important concern because of the perception that liberal 
groups were more likely to turn to the Court during much of this time period.  This may, in 
part, owe to the ideology of the justices sitting on the tribunal.  To measure the Supreme 
Court’s ideological leanings, I use the Martin-Quinn (2002) score indicating the position of 
the Supreme Court’s median justice.  As is the standard practice, the more positive the 
Martin-Quinn score, the more conservative the Court.  The average Martin-Quinn score of 
the cases included in this analysis was .39. 
Method of Analysis 
                                                
51 To consider the broader political climate, I tested other models that also controlled for the ideology of the 
president and Congress.  In all cases, these variables were insignificant, and so I do not show their results here. 
 
52 I also tested the model using Segal-Cover (1989) scores and Judicial Common Space Scores (Epstein et al. 
2007).  Both of these models yielded substantively similar results to those presented here.  Since Martin-Quinn 
scores are somewhat of an industry standard in judicial models that do not predict justices’ votes, I show them 
here. 
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 After transforming my dependent variable from a count to a continuous dependent 
variable, I am able to use ordinary least squares regression as to consider the effects of the 
independent variables on amicus curiae participation.  The models also employ robust 
standard errors.  Robust standard errors are generally used when there is a small departure 
from the fundamental assumptions of the model.  In this case, the assumption of conditional 
independence of observations has likely been violated.  The Supreme Court considers 
multiple cases at one time, and it is likely that a group’s decision to participate in one case is 
affected by other cases on the Court’s agenda. 
 Using OLS to estimate a model of group participation is a relatively unique approach.  
In his model of groups’ decision to participate before the Court, for example, Hansford 
(2004) employs a logit model; this is a logical decision given the binary nature of the 
dependent variable.  And, in his work evaluating the influence of amicus briefs before the 
Court, Collins (2007, 2008) relies on count or logit models, often with dummies for the 
Court’s term to deal with the trend in the number of briefs filed before the Court over time.  I 
believe transforming the dependent variable is a sufficient advancement in the parsimony of 
the model that presents promise for future research.  Using this variable also allows me to 
more effectively consider interest group participation as a function of case characteristics.  In 
addition, as discussed earlier, this variable facilitates greater comparison across cases decided 
during the same term. 
Findings 
 The results of this analysis of interest group participation before the Supreme Court 
can be seen in Table 4.1.  All of the variables are statistically significant and perform in the 
hypothesized direction.  Although their substantive significance varies widely, these models 
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provide evidence for the fact that, by hearing cases that allow groups to achieve their goals of 
influencing public policy and organizational maintenance, the Court can, at least to some 
degree, affect interest group activity.53 
Influencing public policy, although still statistically significant, has a very modest 
substantive effect on interest group participation, especially when compared to other 
variables in the model.  A constitutional case receives about .28 more briefs than the average 
case filed in the same year.  The small magnitude of this result is somewhat surprising; the 
potential causes of this small size are analyzed in greater detail below.  
 Salient cases, which provide groups with greater opportunities for organizational 
maintenance, have the most powerful effect on interest group activity.  As the model 
demonstrates, salient cases attract 4.55 more briefs than the average case filed in the same 
year.  This is a substantial substantive impact, particularly given that the mean number of 
amicus briefs filed in a case over the fifty year time span included in this dataset is but two 
briefs.  It also suggests that these types of cases are important opportunities for the Court to 
set the agenda of other political actors.54 
 The control variables also have a statistically significant effect on the level of amicus 
curiae participation before the Court.  The involvement of the U.S. government, for example, 
has important implications, both as a party and as an amicus.   As expected, the U.S. 
government’s involvement as a party decreases participation by three-quarters of a brief over 
other cases filed in that same year.  As an amicus, however, the solicitor’s involvement 
                                                
53 The r2 of this model is, objectively, small and suggests that a range of other idiosyncratic factors may affect 
group participation.  This is certainly to be expected—some of these factors are even suggested in the theory 
presented in this paper.  However, because previous models have not generally used OLS analysis, it is difficult 
to compare this finding to studies of similar relationships. 
 
54 Again, a model using the New York Times measure (Epstein and Segal 2000) performs similarly. 
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increases participation by more than one brief per case.    
 The control for judicial ideology is also statistically significant, indicating that Courts 
with a more liberal median tend to receive more amicus briefs than their more conservative 
counterparts.  This is not, perhaps, surprising since much of the traditional literature 
documents that liberal groups have used litigation as a form of lobbying more often than their 
conservative counterparts.  However, the substantive significance of this variable is not large; 
a one unit increase in a Court’s Martin-Quinn score only leads to a .16 decrease in the 
number of briefs.  The range of this variable is approximately two units, so the maximum 
change that can be caused by the Court’s ideology remains about one-third of a brief, and is 
likely much smaller on a year-to-year basis.55 
 Taken as a whole, the findings of this model confirm that the characteristics of the 
cases accepted by the Supreme Court statistically and substantively affect the level of interest 
group participation before the Court.  A salient, constitutional decision where the U.S. 
government participates as amicus curiae, for example, attracts almost six more briefs than a 
case filed in the same year that does not have these characteristics. This is a tremendous 
redirection of interest groups’ resources that may have dramatic consequences for 
policymaking in the other branches (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
The Role of Public Policy 
 The most surprising result of this model is that constitutional cases, although 
statistically significant, have a very small substantive effect on the level of participation 
before the Court.  These findings fly in the face of the argument that groups’ primary reason 
for turning to the courts is to influence public policy.  There may be a number of reasons for 
                                                
 
55 Again, models using the Segal-Cover (1989) scores and the Judicial Common Space Scores (Epstein et al. 
2007) perform similarly. 
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this finding. 
First, although many judicial scholars argue that influencing public policy is often the 
primary goal of groups participating before the Court (e.g. Hansford 2004, Collins 2008), this 
may not be the case.  Groups may, instead be pursuing organizational maintenance with 
greater vigor than we assume.  This argument is consistent with the motivation for groups’ 
participation in other stages of the judicial process.  Recent analyses of federal judicial 
nominations, for example, suggest that interest groups have accepted that there is little they 
can do to influence the president’s nominee, especially after that person has reached judicial 
confirmation hearings.  But, groups continue to participate actively in these hearings, 
appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, sending out mail and e-mail, and 
sponsoring television and radio ads.  These activities allow organized interests to claim 
credit, attract new members, and raise money.  In other words, they serve another, more 
important, goal—organizational maintenance (Epstein et al 2006a).  
Second, groups may still be very interested in influencing public policy.  However, 
their litigation strategies may focus not on the type of case and the Court’s ability to create 
lasting policy change in a case (constitutional/statutory), but on their ability to win a case and 
establish a precedent.  If this is the case, some statutory cases may be equally as attractive as 
their constitutional counterparts.  These effects would not be visible in the current model. 
 Finally, it may also be that this result is diluted by the fact that the distinction 
between constitutional and statutory cases is too blunt of an instrument to capture the full 
dynamics of policy-motivated participation before the Court.  In their seminal work on 
interest group participation before the Court, O’Connor and Epstein (1982) demonstrated that 
levels of interest group participation before the Court varied widely even within similar case 
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types.  Constitutional criminal cases, for example, received far less amicus participation than 
other constitutional cases.  More recent scholarship on the Rehnquist Court suggests that 
these differences are smaller in modern times, but it is a possibility worth exploring (Owens 
and Epstein 2005).  Perhaps there are countervailing forces at work.  
Considering the Impact of Criminal Cases 
 To this point, this dissertation has conceptualized the courts’ ability to act as policy 
venues as a dichotomous choice—is the case constitutional or not?  However, such a 
dichotomy is certainly an oversimplification of the judiciary’s role.  One way this may be the 
case is in considering the difference between constitutional cases that involve criminal issues 
and those that do not.  
 The courts are quite able to fulfill the traditional policy venue role in constitutional 
non-criminal cases.  The issues in these cases, which are often hot-button civil rights and 
liberties concerns such as affirmative action and equal protection, are precisely the type of 
matters that require judicial involvement for redefinition and change.  Moreover, the courts’ 
decisions in these cases often have broad consequences that affect a number of policy areas 
and a wide class of citizens.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the 
affirmative action cases of Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) had the ability to affect not 
only education, but business, the military, and society at large. 
 In contrast, criminal cases, even when they deal with constitutional provisions such as 
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments of the Bill of Rights, do not afford the Court the 
opportunity to make such lasting, visible policy change.  If the court decides a case solely 
based on the case facts, it may apply only to a narrow class of circumstances, a phenomenon 
that the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment illustrates perfectly.  
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Though the Court decided a large number of search and seizure cases, each decision only 
applied to limited circumstances—stopped cars, borders, and thermal imaging, to name a 
few.  Moreover, state and local law enforcement and policymakers can more easily challenge 
the courts’ decisions in such cases.  As a result, then, the courts are less able to act as policy 
venues in constitutional criminal cases than constitutional non-criminal cases, and we are 
likely to see interest groups respond to this difference. 
The results of the model support this contention.  There appears to be a significant 
difference in amicus curiae participation between constitutional cases that deal with criminal 
issues and those that do not.  Because the coefficients for all of the other variables remain 
almost identical in both statistical and substantive significance to the previous model, I do 
not discuss them in detail here.  Instead, I focus on the implications of the constitutional case 
variables.56 
 As shown in Figure 4.2, the coefficients of the constitutional-not criminal variable 
and the constitutional-criminal variable have very similar coefficients.  They are, however, in 
the opposite direction.  Constitutional cases that do not deal with criminal issues attract about 
one more brief than the average case filed in a given year.  In contrast, constitutional cases 
that address issues of criminal law receive about one fewer brief than the average case filed 
in a given year.  Although this is a still relatively small effect when compared to salient cases 
or the range of the variable, these coefficients display much larger effects than in the 
previous model.  
 This model also sheds greater light on how the Court can set interest groups’ agendas.  
A certain percentage of the Court’s annual docket deals with constitutional issues.  By 
                                                
56 Again, correlations between salience and constitutional cases may be a concern.  However, these correlations 
remain relatively low—.19 for salience and constitutional non-criminal cases and .04 for salience and 
constitutional criminal cases. 
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choosing to decide constitutional cases that deal more with issues of criminal law, the Court 
may deter groups from participating.  But, when choosing to decide cases that deal with non-
criminal constitutional issues, the Court should expect at least a modest degree of additional 
attention from interest groups. 
Discussion 
 The preceding models provide substantial evidence that the characteristics of the 
cases the Court decides in a given term can affect the level of interest group participation 
before the Court.  Specifically, by deciding cases that enable interest groups to pursue their 
dual goals of influencing public policy and organizational maintenance, the Court can attract 
additional interest group attention in the form of amicus curiae briefs.  This allows the 
justices to gain greater information about the issues at hand and, perhaps, additional attention 
from the general public.  
 Two points resulting from this analysis merit additional attention.  First, I consider 
the effects of salient cases on judicial power.  Second, I consider the importance of this 
analysis for interest groups’ motivations for participation before the Supreme Court. 
Salience and Judicial Power 
The large substantive impact that salient cases have on participation before the Court 
is particularly noteworthy.  Since justices of the Supreme Court have discretionary dockets, 
they are able to choose which of the thousands of cases presented to them they would like to 
hear.  By deciding to decide a case that could be salient to citizens or the legal community 
(or, later in the process, crafting an opinion that increases these odds, as discussed in Chapter 
2), justices, either individually or as a group, can increase their own impact on the political 
system.  This impact can be an extensive one.   
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In short, by attracting greater attention from interest groups, the Court begins an 
agenda-setting domino effect.  These groups not only file amicus briefs, but they also use the 
case as an opportunity to mobilize and send mailings, publications, and email to their 
members and potential constituents.  This contact can activate citizen interest, especially if 
the mainstream media also pays attention to a given case.  And, because interest groups’ 
constituents are often members of a politically aware special public, they are likely to 
continue to push for policy change in an issue area even after the Court hands down its final 
decision.  
Decisions, too, may be catalysts for major group activity beyond the courts.  This 
lobbying of state legislatures, local governments, or the federal executive or legislative 
branch is essential to seeing the Court’s decision implemented (or not implemented), since 
the Court itself has no enforcement power.  Defending (or attempting to defeat) a precedent 
in state and federal courts may also be essential to assuring continued progress in an issue 
area (e.g. Scheingold 1974).  When such a pattern of lobbying behavior occurs, the Court has 
intentionally or unintentionally affected the agendas of other political institutions and 
campaigns.   
For example, interest groups on both sides of the issue used their participation in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) as a springboard to future lobbying efforts.  
While the Court was writing its opinion, for example, pro-choice groups organized a march 
on Washington, D.C. attended by between 400,000 and one million people.  Many of these 
individuals provided mailing addresses and telephone numbers groups could use to get in 
touch with them for years to come.  This allowed the groups to claim larger membership 
(which translates into clout with members of Congress), have a broader fundraising base, and 
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generally engage in more lobbying than they might otherwise have been able to pursue. 
Pro-life activists were similarly inspired by the Court’s decision in Webster.  Scholars 
have, for example, asserted that the growth of the direct action movement at abortion clinics 
(i.e. clinic protestors) was a direct result of the Court’s decision.  They argue that this 
decision got the attention of average citizens who would not have otherwise considered the 
abortion issue at the center of their lives (Stagenborg 1991).  These individuals formed local 
citizen action groups, who were able to mobilize and create controversy that resulted in more 
than ten years of litigation and, eventually, reframing the abortion issue before the Supreme 
Court. 
 The critic will say that many issues that meet the “salient” criteria already have places 
on the public or systemic agenda, and that the Court’s decision is merely a validation of an 
issue’s importance, not the creation or emergence of a new issue.  While this may be true in 
some cases, it is most certainly not always the case.  As we know from Chapter 3, the 
activities of the Court can be a powerful agenda setter, particularly in issue areas where it 
most frequently acts as a policy venue.   
More anecdotally, the courts, particularly when their decisions alter the status quo, 
may—and often do (as discussed in Chapter 3)—lead issues waiting for their time to come to 
take visible positions on the public and systemic agendas.  Though the Court may struggle to 
enforce these decisions without force or will, their judgment compels other political actors to 
take up issues they might otherwise avoid.  Examples of this behavior, from gender and race 
discrimination to criminal rights, abound. 
Interest Groups’ Motivations 
Though this is not the central focus of this study, the findings of this analysis also 
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speak to interest groups’ motivations for amicus participation before the Court.  Although by 
definition interest groups are collections of individuals who join together to influence public 
policy, it appears that this goal may not motivate amicus participation before the Court as 
often as scholars have hypothesized.  Instead, this model reveals that groups may more 
frequently turn to participating as amicus curiae before the Court because they are seeking to 
claim credit for political activity.   
One empirical explanation for this finding may be that the dependent variable used in 
this analysis has illuminated different motivations than previous analyses.  By using the 
numbers of briefs filed before the Court in each case—rather than a group’s decision to lobby 
the Court during a given term or case (Hansford 2004, Solberg and Waltenburg 2006)—as 
the dependent variable, I capture a totally different phenomenon.  Groups may, as previous 
scholars have suggested, make the individual decision to lobby the Court (as compared to not 
participating) because it is considering an important policy issue.  But, all cases are not 
equal; cases that allow groups to pursue organizational maintenance (alone or in combination 
with influencing policy), may attract a disproportionate amount of that participation. 
Several theoretical explanations for this relationship may exist.  First, and perhaps 
most importantly, it may be that the groups most interested influencing public policy through 
litigation do not participate as amicus curiae, but instead choose to sponsor test cases and 
shepherd litigation through the legal process.  This type of participation is not captured in the 
data used here, so it is difficult to speak conclusively on this contention.  However, 
anecdotally, we know that many of the groups most engaged in issue areas such as race, 
gender, and sexual discrimination have been very active case sponsors.  As Cortner (1975) 
has noted, “cases do not arrive on the doorstep of the Supreme Court like orphans in the 
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night.”57 
Second, neo-pluralist theories of interest group formation and survival suggest that 
within any issue area, there can only be a finite number of interest groups working to achieve 
policy change.  An even smaller number of these groups have the financial and human 
resources to participate before the Court; many groups also work together to file co-signed 
amicus briefs.  Thus, the number of purely policy motivated briefs that can be filed in a 
particular issue area or case is necessarily limited.  To move beyond this number, groups 
with a smaller stake or tangential interest must be engaged.  Claiming credit for their 
involvement in the case may be a more powerful incentive than influencing public policy, 
especially in visible cases. 
 Finally, it is not a stretch to say that the Court acts as a policy venue in less than a 
third of its cases.  But, even when the Court’s decisions have little immediate or lasting 
impact on public policy, these cases may be important to an interested clientele, who expect 
interest groups representing them to be involved before the judiciary.  This trend is magnified 
in issue areas that are already salient.  In many ways, then, it can be said that credit claiming 
is a more broadly applicable goal for interest groups than influencing public policy. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter demonstrates that the characteristics of cases the Court decides can 
influence interest groups’ lobbying activities.  Even after controlling for other factors that 
shape interest group participation, significantly more briefs are filed in cases that allow 
interest groups to pursue their dual goals of influencing public policy and organizational 
                                                
57 Capturing the groups that sponsor particular cases is a difficult endeavor.  Sometimes groups (and their 
lawyers) openly acknowledge the role they play in bringing cases before the Court.  On other occasions, groups 
and lawyers may have privately acknowledged relationships that are not discussed on briefs.  And, in still other 
cases, lawyers may list an interest groups’ address on a brief but not provide the name of the group. 
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maintenance.   This finding suggests that the Court’s docket composition may be extremely 
important in establishing and maintaining its institutional power, as well as its influence over 
the American policy making process. 
 However, this is just the beginning of courts’ influence on the policymaking process.  
While this analysis confirms that there is a link between the Court’s docket and interest 
groups’ lobbying activity before the Court, it still does not provide concrete evidence of how, 
if at all, the Court’s case selection process influences interest groups’ broader resource 
allocations. In other words, this analysis alone cannot answer the question of whether groups 
consciously acknowledge the Court’s institutional power when crafting their lobbying 
strategies.  
 Chapter 5 uses a variety of data sources on lobbying activity in both the Court and 
Congress to shed greater light on this balancing act.  It first reviews lobbying registrations 
before the legislature, and then turns to interest group participation before the Court.  Finally, 
it compares and contrasts participation before each of these branches with a special eye 
toward issue area.  In so doing, it answers a number of significant questions regarding the 
effects of the Court’s case selection process on interest group agendas.  For example, do 
groups that focus on constitutional issues devote greater resources to lobbying the Court than 
groups that are interested in statutory issues?  Are groups that are interested in constitutional 
issues less likely to lobby the legislature than their statutory counterparts?  And, how are 
these differences reflected in the populations of interest groups that lobby each branch? 
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Figure 4.1. Average Number of Amicus Briefs Per Year, 1946-2001 
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Figure 4.2. Average Deviation of Amicus Briefs Per Year, 1946-2001 
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Table 4.1. Predictors of Amicus Participation Before the Supreme Court 
 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
Constitutional Issue 
 
.28 
(.10) 
*** 
Salient Case 4.55 
(.46) 
*** 
Solicitor General Amicus 1.33 
(.16) 
*** 
U.S. as Party 
 
-.77 
(.08) 
*** 
Supreme Court Median -.16 
(.08) 
** 
Constant -.38 
(.07) 
*** 
F 64.91 *** 
R
2
 .14  
 
n=5,148 
*Significant at p < .10 (two-tailed). 
**Significant at p< .05 (two-tailed). 
***Significant at p < .01 (two-tailed). 
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Table 4.2. Predictors of Amicus Participation Before the Supreme Court Reconsidered 
 
 Coefficient 
(Robust S.E.) 
Constitutional, Non-Criminal 
 
1.00 
(.14) 
*** 
Constitutional, Criminal 
 
-.96 
(.10) 
*** 
Salient Case 4.38 
(.44) 
*** 
Solicitor General Amicus 1.39 
(.16) 
*** 
U.S. as Party 
 
-.59 
(.08) 
*** 
Supreme Court Median -.17 
(.08) 
** 
Constant -.43 
(.07) 
*** 
F 67.74 *** 
R
2
 .16  
 
n=5,148 
*Significant at p < .10 (two-tailed). 
**Significant at p< .05 (two-tailed). 
***Significant at p < .01 (two-tailed). 
  
CHAPTER 5 
 
EXPLAINING JUDICIAL EFFECTS ON LEGISLATIVE LOBBYING
 
To this point, I have only considered the judiciary’s ability to affect interest group 
participation before the courts.  But, if it is true that interest groups are strategic policy actors 
with limited resources, groups’ decisions to respond to the agenda of the judiciary should 
also come at the expense of lobbying activity in other branches.   This chapter examines 
whether such a tradeoff occurs with respect to the legislature.58   
Using data on interest group activity before the U.S. Supreme Court and registered 
lobbyists before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, I show that, groups do, 
indeed, make calculated decisions about how to allocate their lobbying resources.  These 
decisions are affected by a number of factors, including the policy agendas of each branch.   
The findings of this analysis provide further evidence that the types of cases the judiciary 
decides can have significant policy implications. 
Theoretical Foundation 
As the theory in Chapter 4 posited, interest groups that choose to lobby the federal 
government have limited resources and must make choices regarding how they participate.  
These concerns should affect participation not only within one branch, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, but across branches.  Groups must decide when and how to direct limited 
                                                
58 Testing judicial, legislative, and executive lobbying would be ideal, but consistent lobbying disclosure data 
are not readily available for the executive branch, even through standardized processes such as notice and 
comments. 
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resources toward lobbying the judiciary, and when to lobby the legislature instead.  Similarly, 
although not the focus of this analysis, groups must consider when their efforts would best be 
spent working with regulators in the bureaucracy and when to turn to the Supreme Court. 
The Role of Resources59 
Resources are essential to interest groups’ survival in the political system.  Without 
resources, broadly defined, groups would be weak political actors able to attract little 
attention from policymakers or the public.  Organized interests would also struggle to change 
policy or maintain their organizations.  
Interest groups, however, do not have unlimited resources.  As a result, they must 
make decisions about how to use the resources they have—or lack—to their political 
advantage.  Here, I consider four interest group resources that scholars have regarded as 
particularly important (see Gray and Lowery 1996): (1) finances (Walker 1983), (2) 
membership (Salisbury 1984, Lowery and Gray 1995), (3) selective benefits (Olson 1965, 
Wilson 1973, Moe 1980), and (4) access to policy-makers (Browne 1990).  I discuss each 
resource and evaluate how that resource limits and expands groups’ ability to lobby. 
Funding 
 When thinking about resource constraints on interest groups, funding is perhaps the 
most significant.  Without financial resources, groups simply cannot exist—they have no way 
to pay for day-to-day expenses such as office space, staff, and supplies.  And, without the 
funds to pursue these simplest of goals, groups have little to no way of raising their visibility 
in the media and the public, attracting the attention of new members, or organizing lobbying 
strategies to attract the attention of policymakers. 
                                                
59 Some of the discussion of resources in this section borrows from Chamberlain and Yanus (2009). 
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 Funding may come from a number of sources.  For many groups, membership 
contributions and other small donations are the major source of funds.  Prominent organized 
interests may also have large-scale charitable functions that help to offset operating costs.  
These groups may also have patrons (e.g. foundations or governments) that support their 
activities.  And, still other groups may derive their funds from alternative sources, such as 
dedicated corporate or institutional budget lines devoted to governmental relations. 
 Groups with larger budgets, of course, are faced with fewer decisions about lobbying 
one branch of the government at the expense of another.  Such groups—the NAACP, for 
example—are able to establish both litigating and lobbying arms and make their presence felt 
throughout the policy process.  But, groups such as these are the exception and not the rule.  
Most groups’ budgets force them to choose a focus, based on a variety of factors, including 
influencing public policy, organizational maintenance, and agenda composition.  
Traditionally, research has shown that groups with greater resources do not choose to lobby 
the judiciary first.  These groups turn to the legislature and leave the courts for the 
“politically disadvantaged” (Cortner 1968). 
Membership 
Members are the lifeblood of most non-institutional interest groups.  Members, first 
and foremost, pay dues that fund groups’ lobbying activities.  They also provide organized 
interests with a loyal network of grassroots supporters who can lobby policymakers at all 
levels of government and give groups clout as they approach political leaders.  As a result, 
the number of members a group has can be a strong determinant of lobbying strategy.  
Groups with more members, for example, are more likely to have larger budgets and be more 
able to pursue diverse lobbying agendas.  They also face advantages in lobbying the 
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legislature since representing a greater number of constituents becomes important for 
members wanting to win reelection. 
Membership, of course, is not a one-sided proposition.  In exchange for dues and 
support, interest groups provide members with a variety of benefits.  These may include 
representation of their viewpoint during the policy process, information that they might not 
be able to access in other forums, and a range of unique selective benefits. 
Selective Benefits 
Selective benefits, in and of themselves, do not provide groups with significant 
advantages in the lobbying process.  However, the literature has long noted that selective 
benefits, or those benefits offered only to individuals who join a group, serve an important 
role in maintaining a group’s membership (Olson 1965, Moe 1980).  Groups offer selective 
benefits to differentiate themselves from other groups and provide a unique reason for people 
to join, and donate to, their group.  All else equal, individuals are more likely to remain 
members of an organization if the group’s selective benefits provide them with information 
and opportunities that cannot be obtained outside the group.  This can involve anything from 
magazines and newsletters to trips and cookouts with other members and donors.   
It is worth noting that some groups, such as AARP or the American Automobile 
Association (AAA), rely more heavily on selective benefits than others.  People do not 
typically join groups such as these just because they are over 50 or because they own a car.  
Instead, they join to enjoy the various selective benefits the groups offer, including discounts 
and travel packages.   These benefits often have little to do with the groups’ policy goals, and 
in this case, as long as the group retains the capacity to continue to offer these benefits, the 
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group is likely to retain members and all of the attendant benefits discussed in the previous 
section. 
Access to Policymakers 
As I have extensively discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, the goal of interest 
groups, by definition, is to influence public policy.  This means that they must clearly 
articulate their position to government officials, with the long-term goal of having 
policymakers advocate for their cause and pass legislation, enforce a regulation, or alter a 
precedent.  Having greater financial and human resources facilitates this process and means 
that groups have a greater ability to set the agenda as well as more contacts within the 
government.  They are also less limited in their ability to lobby and can make more frequent 
contacts with policymakers (see discussion of Galanter [1974] below). 
Making Choices About How to Lobby 
As discussed in the previous section, groups’ ability to lobby is constrained by human 
and financial resources, as well as their capacity to offer selective benefits and build contacts 
with policymakers.  Thus, periodically—perhaps at the beginning of each (calendar or fiscal) 
year—groups (or more often, their leadership boards) must step back and examine the 
political landscape and assess where their financial and human resources would best be 
allocated.60   These considerations, certainly, are affected by groups’ dual motivations of 
policy change and organizational maintenance, which are discussed at length in the previous 
chapter.  They may include crafting a lobbying strategy, designing member outreach 
campaigns, or any of the other tasks groups must undertake to survive. 
Agenda Composition 
                                                
60 As scholars, we lack an understanding of how groups allocate their lobbying resources.  Further qualitative 
research is necessary to reach a greater comprehension. 
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Groups’ considerations should, however, also be altered by their impressions about 
the composition of an institution’s agenda over a longer time period.  If an institution has 
developed a reputation as a policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), groups may see 
significant benefits from specializing in lobbying that branch.  These advantages may come 
in the form of close relationships with policy makers, lower costs for lobbying on individual 
policy actions, or higher rates of success in making public policy.  Such specialization allows 
groups to get more for their money, as activities become more cost-effective over time.  
Specialization may also enable groups to increase their rate of success in influencing public 
policy.  For example, in discussing “repeat players,” or lawyers who appear before a given 
court again and again, Galanter (1974: 99) argues that these actors achieve greater success 
than their counterparts, who he dubs “one shotters.”   Repeat players, he argues, appear 
before courts so frequently that they establish special relationships, expertise, and credibility 
with the judges or justices as they “play the odds,” bringing only the most winnable cases to 
a court for their resolution.61  
These long-term considerations, however, are not absolute.  For example, consider an 
interest group that traditionally spends a significant portion of its resources lobbying the 
judiciary.  In a given year, however, the Supreme Court may choose not to consider a 
particular issue.  So, the group must decide whether to direct greater resources to lobbying 
the lower courts, or to redirect resources to the legislature, the executive branch, or to other 
pursuits.  These calculations will be influenced by perceived opportunities to influence public 
                                                
61 In practice, scholarship has found mixed results on the success of repeat players before the courts (see, for 
example, Atkins 1991, Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley 1999, Kritzer and Silbey 2003, McCormick 1993, 
McGuire 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995, Songer, Kuersten, and Kaheny 2000, Songer and Sheehan 1992, Wheeler 
et al 1987). 
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policy or carry out organizational maintenance that may appear on an institution’s agenda 
during that year.   
Hypotheses 
 The theory articulated here and in Chapter 4 posits that most interest groups have 
limited resources and therefore must make choices about how they allocate those resources in 
lobbying the federal government.  These decisions may be affected by influencing public 
policy and organizational maintenance, as shown in Chapter 4.  An additional way for groups 
to make choices about how to allocate these resources is to respond to the issues that make 
up the policy agendas of each of the political institutions.  When one institution devotes more 
attention to an issue, both in the long and short term, groups interested in that issue should be 
more likely to shift their resources and goals toward that branch. 
Specifically, then, groups interested in issues that comprise a greater percentage of 
the judicial agenda should devote a disproportionately high ratio of their resources to 
participation before this branch.   This participation should come at the expense of legislative 
lobbying.  The reverse should also be true.  Groups interested in issues that comprise a 
greater percentage of the legislative agenda should devote a disproportionately high ratio of 
their resources to participation before this branch.   This participation should come at the 
expense of judicial lobbying.62 
Data 
 This analysis brings together data from a variety of sources to build a fuller 
understanding of how the Court’s docket affects interest groups’ lobbying activity in the 
legislative and judicial branches.  The paragraphs that follow highlight these data sources and 
                                                
62 I use the term “judicial lobbying” to encompass the range of activities interest groups undertake to influence 
policy before the courts.  This includes case sponsorship, filing amicus briefs, and joining amicus briefs written 
by others. 
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discuss how they were used to compare and contrast groups’ participation across the 
legislative and judicial branches. 
Issue Area 
 To more fully understand how the composition of the legislative and judicial agendas 
influenced interest groups’ decisions about which branch to lobby, it was imperative to 
separate lobbying activity across issue areas.  As in Chapter 3, I defer to the Policy Agendas 
Project (Baumgartner and Jones 2009) to draw distinctions between issue areas.  The Project 
separates the activities of each branch of the American national government into nineteen 
broad categories, ranging from education to agriculture to macroeconomics.  These 
categories can be seen in Table 5.1.63 
 The Policy Agendas Project is an ideal coding scheme for a number of reasons.  First, 
Baumgartner and Jones have made substantial efforts to code the activities of each of the 
branches using this unified coding scheme.  As a result, researchers can download databases 
of congressional laws and hearings, Supreme Court decisions, and presidential speeches 
coded by issue area.  Second, Baumgartner and Jones have encouraged other scholars to 
adopt these codes, and this has been done in other datasets such as the Congressional Bills 
Project.   Third, these codes are relatively straightforward and easy to employ in recoding 
data coded using other issue codes. Finally, Baumgartner and Jones have also made 
substantial efforts to apply similar codes to other countries and the American states, so using 
this coding scheme presents the opportunity for comparison across other national and 
subnational units, should the appropriate data become available.   
Legislative Data 
                                                
63 For more detail on the policy areas that fall under each of the nineteen major topic codes employed by the 
Policy Agendas Project, see the Project’s website at http://www.policyagendas.org/codebooks/topicindex.html.  
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 Data on the raw number of groups lobbying the legislature is drawn from 
Baumgartner and Leech’s Lobbying Disclosure Dataset.  This dataset catalogs all of the 
lobbyists registered to lobby the federal Congress during the 1996 calendar year (the second 
session of the 104th Congress).  This data is collected from lobbying disclosure reports filed 
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. 
 Unfortunately, the 78 issue codes used by Baumgartner and Leech to code the 
lobbying activities on these reports predate the simplified nineteen issue area coding scheme 
used in the Policy Agendas Project.  However, I was able to recode the great majority of 
issue areas to match their correct Policy Agendas code.  For example, groups with lobbyists 
coded “CIV” for Civil Rights and Liberties mapped neatly onto Policy Agendas Project issue 
area 2, Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties.  Similarly, groups with lobbyists 
coded “ROD” for Roads and Highways mapped neatly on to Policy Agendas Project issue 
area 10, Transportation.  One major exception to this successful recoding were groups with 
lobbyists coded “TRD” for Domestic and Foreign Trade, which does not neatly map into one 
category on the Policy Agendas Dataset.  It is for this reason that all of the following 
analyses omit Policy Agendas Project issue area 18 (Foreign Trade). 
 The raw number of lobbyists registered to lobby on an issue, although a useful data 
point, does not account for the legislature’s variable attention to issue areas.  For example, 
100 lobbyists registered in a policy area where Congress considered 100 bills is a much 
denser concentration (and a much greater dedication of resources) than 100 lobbyists in an 
issue area where Congress considers 500 bills.  Thus, where appropriate, I create ratios of the 
number of lobbyists per bill by matching the Lobbying Disclosure Data with data from the 
Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2009).  This data source includes 
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comprehensive information on all of the bills filed during the 104th Congress.  Although the 
lobbying data includes only groups registered to lobby during the Congress’ second session, I 
choose to use all of the bills proposed during the 104th Congress, because only a small 
fraction of these had become law as of January 1, 1996, and as such, most were still very 
much on the table for consideration by Congress during its second session. 
Bills, however, may be a very broad measure of congressional activity.  Any member 
of Congress can propose a bill on any issue, and it does not necessarily mean that Congress is 
particularly interested in or acting upon this issue.  As an additional examination of the way 
that the congressional agenda (and actions taken by Congress) affects interest group activity, 
I also consider the ratio of lobbyists to the number of hearings held by Congress on each 
issue area during calendar year 1996.  This data is obtained from the Congressional Hearings 
database of the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). 
Judicial Data 
 Data on the number of groups participating and the number of cases heard before the 
judiciary is drawn from information collected by Collins and Soloweij (2007).  This database 
includes counts of every group writing or joining an amicus curiae brief in each case heard 
before the Court during its 1995 term (October 1995 to June 1996).  Each group is classified 
by a number of variables, including group type and whether they supported the petitioner or 
the respondent.  
I used the Policy Agendas Project’s Supreme Court database to identify the issue area 
of each case.  This information allowed for comparisons regarding group participation in 
each issue area across the legislative and judicial branches.  I also used it to create ratios of 
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groups participating before the Court to cases heard by the Court.  These ratios were created 
for the same reasons discussed in the legislative section. 
Findings 
 Before examining interest group participation, it is important to verify that 1996 is not 
an anomalous year in the activity of the legislature and the judiciary.   This verification leads 
to greater confidence in and ability to generalize from the findings shown here. 
 As shown in Figure 5.1, 1996 is a rather average year in the business of Congress.  
The proportion of hearings devoted to each issue area is relatively the same across all years 
from 1972-2006 and in 1996 alone.  The highest proportions of hearings by issue area relate 
to Finance, Defense, International Affairs, Government Operations, and Public Lands.  The 
lowest proportions of hearings by issue area relate to Civil Liberties, Social Welfare, and 
Housing.  All other issues generally fall somewhere in the middle.   
 Figure 5.2 yields similar results for the judiciary.  When compared to all terms from 
1972-2003, the 1995-1996 term displays overall similar trends in terms of the proportion of 
cases in each issue area.  In both 1995-1996 and all years included in this database, the Court 
considered the greatest proportion of cases in the issue areas of Civil Liberties, Labor, Law, 
and Finance.  It considered a moderate proportion of cases dealing with government 
operations and public lands, and much fewer cases in all other issue areas.  Thus, it appears 
that the 1995-1996 term is not an anomalous term of the Court. 
Institutional Agenda Composition  
There is no doubt that interest group participation before both the legislature and the 
judiciary is a vital enterprise, and a subject of substantial concern for a wide array of policy 
actors.  However, as the theory posits, groups’ limited resources should compel them to have 
118 
to make choices about their lobbying behavior.  These choices should be shaped, at least in 
part, by the issues the legislative and judicial branches choose to consider.  The paragraphs 
that follow explore the effects of these policy agendas in greater detail.  
Considering the Legislature 
As shown in Figure 5.3a, the raw number of groups and individuals registered to 
lobby Congress in 1996 ranges from a high of more than 3,000 groups in Health to a low of 
less than 150 groups in Civil Rights.   These differences are dramatic; widely different 
numbers of groups lobby on each issue area.  This finding may be suggestive of the fact that 
groups allocate attention to the legislature very differently across issue areas. 
These differences, however, become even more remarkable after accounting for 
Congress’ relative issue attention to policy areas.  Figure 5.3b shows the number of groups 
registered to lobby in an issue area as a ratio of the number of bills proposed in that issue 
area.  The graph reveals a high of more ten groups per bill for Science and Technology.  This 
high figure is likely the result of Congress’s consideration of, and the president’s ultimate 
approval of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Macroeconomics also exhibits a high 
ratio, with more than seven groups registered per bill.  On the other hand, Civil Rights and 
Law display the lowest ratios, with about 0.6 groups registered per bill. 
I also consider the number of groups registered to lobby in an issue area as a ratio of 
the number of hearings proposed in that issue area.  These results are shown in Figure 5.3c.  
The graph reveals a high of more than 60 groups per hearing for Macroeconomics, as well as 
high values for Education, Environment, and Housing.  Low ratios of participation occur for 
Civil Rights, Law, and International Affairs. 
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Although the issue areas with the highest levels of interest group participation vary 
somewhat across hearings and bills, one truth remains the same.  In both cases, the issue 
areas with the highest levels of participation are those where the legislature has significant 
power to create lasting policy change.  In contrast, the most constitutional of the issue areas, 
law and civil rights, fall among the lowest ratios of groups to both hearings and bills.64 
Considering the Judiciary  
Very different patterns of participation become evident in examining group 
participation in the judiciary.  Figure 5.4a shows the raw number of groups participating as 
amicus curiae in each issue area.  Law, Finance, and Civil Rights are quite distinct from all 
other groups, with 377, 257, and 213 amici, respectively.  No other issue area has more than 
75 participants.  Notably, these issue areas correspond with the major categories of Supreme 
Court cases studied by judicial scholars—criminal procedure, economics, and civil liberties.  
They are also issue areas where the Court considers a significant proportion of constitutional 
cases, and is, therefore, more likely to act as a policy venue. 
Figure 5.4b controls for the number of cases on the Court’s docket by calculating 
ratios of groups per case in each issue area.  Generally speaking, it reveals similar trends.  
Among issue areas where the Court heard more than one case during its 1995 term, Civil 
Rights, Finance, and Law also have the highest levels of amici per case.  Only Technology 
even approaches the average level of participation seen in these issue areas. 
Inter-Institutional Agenda Composition 
                                                
64 Admittedly, the number of groups lobbying in an issue area is just one measure of groups’ dedication of 
resources to an issue area.  In an ideal world, I would also consider variables such as group size and budgets, 
but reliable data does not exist on these variables for even a small cross-section of the more than 10,000 groups 
considered here. 
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The real effects of institutions’ agenda composition, however, become evident when 
participation in the legislature is combined with participation in the judiciary.  The simplest 
way to consider the effects of these agendas is to consider the ratio of the number of amici 
per case to the number of lobbyists per bill (or hearing).  If groups participate at relatively 
equal levels across issue areas and branches, the ratio of participation should be at 
approximately the same level for each issue area. 
This, however, is not the case.  Figure 5.5a shows the ratio of amici per case to 
lobbyists per bill in issue areas where the Court considered more than one case.  Clearly 
evident is the fact that this value is dramatically different for Civil Rights, Law, and, to a 
lesser extent, Finance. These are all issue areas where the Court, on average, adjudicates a 
high proportion of cases (see Figure 5.2), and issue areas in which the legislature holds the 
fewest hearings (see Figure 5.1).  They are also issue areas that are largely constitutional, and 
thus where the Court is more likely to act as a policy venue.   
 It should, then, be little surprise that the same issue areas are outliers in Figure 5.5b, 
which shows the ratio of amici per case to groups per hearing.  Although the rank ordering of 
Civil Rights and Law varies across the two graphs, the sentiment is the same.  Once again, 
these issues, and to a lesser extent Finance, are distinctly different than the other issues that 
repeatedly came before the Court during this time. 
This result provides some preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that a branch’s 
policy agenda influences interest groups’ decisions about how to allocate their lobbying 
resources.  However, these results are only preliminary.  To provide additional evidence for 
the link between institutional agendas and interest groups’ lobbying behavior, I conduct a 
series of ordinary least squares regression models, shown in Table 5.2.  In each of these 
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cases, the dependent variable is the number of groups participating before a given branch in 
each of the eighteen issue areas.  The independent variables are based on institutional 
agendas.  Although the n of eighteen in each of these models is quite small, they can provide 
additional preliminary evidence of a relationship between inter-institutional agendas and 
lobbying activity. 
 Models I and II address the connection between interest group activity in the 
legislature and the legislative agenda.  Model I considers the effect of the number of bills on 
group participation, while Model II considers the effect of congressional hearings on group 
participation. In each case, there is some evidence that the types of issues the legislature 
chooses to consider affects the level of interest group participation before that branch.  
Specifically, as the House and Senate consider more bills or holds more hearings on an issue, 
participation in that issue area increases.  
Model III provides similar evidence for the judiciary.  This model reveals a very 
powerful connection between the number of cases considered in an issue area and the number 
of groups lobbying the Court in that issue area.  As the Court considers more cases in an 
issue area, the number of participants increases dramatically. 
 The most powerful evidence for the role of institutional agendas, however, can be 
found in Model IV, which considers the effects of both the legislative (measured as bills65) 
and judicial agendas on group participation in the legislature.66  This model provides 
evidence that as the legislature’s attention to an issue area increases, so does the number of 
                                                
65 I measure the legislative agenda using bills because the model fit for the bills-only model was better than the 
model fit for the hearings-only model.  I cannot put both bills and hearings in the same model because of their 
high correlation and the low n of this model. 
 
66 Because the correlation between cases and groups lobbying the court is so strong, I am unable to calculate a 
similar model using judicial participation as the dependent variable. 
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groups registered to lobby that branch in that issue areaee.  However, the reverse can be said 
about the judiciary.  As the judiciary considers more cases in an issue area, the number of 
groups registered to lobby Congress in that issue area exhibits a modest but significant 
decline. 
 This model thus provides additional evidence that policy agendas—both within that 
institution and in other institutions—are important in shaping interest groups’ lobbying 
activities.  Moreover, it provides evidence that groups may choose to turn away from 
lobbying one branch when another branch devotes significant attention to a policy area.  
This, as I will discuss, has significant consequences for the policy process. 
Discussion 
The prior section demonstrates that there are dramatic differences in interest groups’ 
participation in the legislature and judiciary.  The overall composition of the legislative and 
judicial branches’ policy agendas appear to influence how groups allocate their lobbying 
resources in a given year.67  Participation in the legislature, for example, is much higher in 
issue areas where Congress considers more bills and in issue areas that are not constitutional.  
And, participation before the Court is higher in issue areas where the Court hears the most 
cases.  It is especially high in issue areas dominated by constitutional cases. 
 In many ways, these findings expand upon the lessons of Chapter 4.  In crafting their 
lobbying strategies—both within and across branches—groups have to make decisions about 
how to allocate limited human and financial resources.  They likely make these decisions not 
                                                
67 Of course, this finding does not exclude the possibility that groups are also responding to institutions’ long-
term policy agendas in allocating their resources.  Groups may make their initial strategic decisions about how 
to lobby and allocate their resources based on institutions’ reputations as policy venues for a particular issue, 
and also make smaller changes to their strategies as they see what issues appear on institutional agendas in a 
given year.  Without further qualitative data on how and when interests allocate their resources, as well as 
reliable data on groups and agendas for multiple years, it is difficult to make a definitive statement on how this 
process plays out. 
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only based on short term considerations regarding policy change and organizational 
maintenance (as discussed here and in Chapter 4), but also institutions’ long term reputations 
for acting as policy venues, crafting policy change, and attracting media attention.  
Responding to these dual forces and incentives allows groups to become more efficient and 
more specialized, and allows them to develop unique relationships with policy actors in each 
branch (akin to becoming what Galanter [1974] calls “repeat players”).  
These findings also demonstrate that the cases that the Court chooses to hear have 
broad policy consequences that extend beyond the marble halls of the nation’s highest 
tribunal.  As previously discussed, the composition of the Court’s docket affects how interest 
groups allocate their lobbying resources both within and across branches.  These effects may 
extend far beyond a given term.  This, in turn, affects not only the information received by 
the Court, but also the information received by the other branches of the federal government 
(in this case, the legislature).  It affects the attentiveness of policy monitoring by these 
groups, and alters the constituencies that policymakers feel the greatest pressure to please. 
For example, a group such as America’s Health Insurance Plans, which is primarily 
interested in healthcare issues is likely to choose to focus on lobbying Congress.  This means 
that the group is more likely to spend its money to hire lobbyists registered to address 
Congress,68 forge relationships with the members of House and Senate Commerce 
Committees, and claim credit for victories won in the legislature.  The group is also likely to 
target its research to members and their staffs.  In contrast, a group such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which deals largely with issues of civil rights and liberties, is likely to 
gear its attention toward lobbying the judiciary.  The group’s ACLU Foundation and various 
                                                
68 Many of these lobbyists may even be former members of Congress or former congressional staffers. 
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litigation projects, for example, employ a large number of lawyers who act as lobbyists in 
state and federal courts.  It is also likely to expend a great deal of resources on choosing and 
crafting test cases and claiming involvement in these cases.  It is also more probable that the 
ACLU will be a frequent participant before the Supreme Court as amicus curiae.  
 This specialization creates a symbiotic relationship between interest groups and 
government that reinforces institutions’ positions as policy venues.  A group interested in a 
given issue strategically chooses to lobby a particular branch of government precisely 
because it is the most likely agent to create lasting long- and short-term policy change.    But, 
interest group lobbying in a particular branch of government also generates media attention 
and constituent awareness that further cements that branch’s control over a policy issue.   
This symbiosis is not an entirely new idea (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  But, the 
idea that such a relationship can occur in the judiciary as well as the legislature has received 
little attention.  Similarly neglected has been empirical evidence that there is interdependence 
(or at least a strategic decision) between groups’ decision to participate in the legislature and 
groups’ decision to participate in the judiciary.   
 The failure to consider interest group activity in an inter-institutional context is not 
unique to this area of analysis. Too often, researchers studying organized interests base their 
conclusions on just one branch of government.  Data limitations may also lead them to 
consider only a few issue areas.  But, these results suggest that narrow studies such as these 
may not tell the whole story about who participates, when, and how much.  
Conclusion 
Using data on interest group activity before the U.S. Supreme Court and registered 
lobbyists before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, I show that, groups make 
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calculated decisions about how to allocate their lobbying resources.  These decisions are 
affected by a number of factors, including each branch’s overall agenda composition.   The 
findings of this analysis provide further evidence that the types of cases the Court decides to 
decide can have significant policy implications, both in the courts and in the federal 
government. 
These results are a reminder that the judiciary is but one branch in a federal system 
built on the interdependent systems of separation of powers and checks and balances.  They 
also suggest that the Court may not need the purse or the sword to affect the activities of 
other policy actors. The discretion that comes from deciding to decide particular types of 
cases is a powerful tool for the judiciary. 
Beyond the judiciary, this analysis is just the beginning of fully understanding the 
strategic lobbying decisions of interest groups, both across issue areas and across branches of 
the government.  It invites scholars to begin more serious consideration of the consequences 
of institutional agendas, not only for the institution’s own policy outputs, but also for the 
policy outputs of other branches and the activities of other actors within the political system.  
A longitudinal study of interest groups’ decision to participate in different branches of 
the United States government would the logical first step to enriching the conclusions of this 
chapter.  However, such a study has not, to date, been possible.  In fact, it is extraordinarily 
remarkable that data to compare amicus curiae participation before the Court and lobbying 
activity before Congress was available for even one year.  Although interest groups scholars 
have taken great steps to increase the availability of legislative lobbying data (see 
Baumgartner et al 2009), judicial scholars have not placed an emphasis on collecting similar 
data on amicus participation.  Outside of the data in the Spaeth Phase II dataset, the data used 
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here (Collins and Soloweij 2007), and a three-year analysis by Schlozman et al (2007), there 
is almost no data on the number of groups—let alone the identity of the groups—
participating before the Court across all issue areas.  The lack of such data creates a 
significant impediment to scholars’ understanding of groups’ strategic lobbying behavior, 
both within the judiciary and across branches.   
It is also important for future scholars of organized interests to broaden their 
consideration of interest group activity to consider not just the legislature and the judiciary, 
but also the executive branch.  Very little published scholarship accounts for lobbying 
activities in all three branches; this is a fundamental weakness of extant interest groups 
scholarship (but see e.g. Heclo 1978).  This likely owes to the challenges with accessing and 
collecting reliable data on interest groups and lobbyists participating in the executive branch 
for any range of agencies or length of time.  Still, making an attempt to understand how 
executive branch activity affects the conclusions drawn here, even in a few issue areas, 
would also be a step in the right direction.   
Finally, enriching quantitative accounts of group participation with qualitative data 
obtained from the groups’ would significantly increase the validity of theory posited here. 
Knowledge of how groups budget, when and how they must commit resources, how they 
respond to new issues on the policy agenda, and a range of other topics would help to provide 
greater understanding of which incentives groups believe they are responding to most. 
 For now, however, I set these future considerations to the side and turn to bringing 
together the findings of this and the preceding three chapters.  The concluding chapter of this 
dissertation, Chapter 6, fully considers the effects of the judiciary’s ability to affect the 
agenda of other political actors—specifically the media and interest groups. 
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Figure 5.1. Congressional Hearings by Issue Area 
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Figure 5.2. Supreme Court Docket by Issue Area 
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Figure 5.3. Interest Group Participation in the Legislature by Issue Area 
 
Note: Data from the Lobbying Disclosure Data Set. 
 
Note: This includes all House and Senate Bills from the 104th Congress.  Bill data from the Congressional Bills Project,  
Groups Data from the Lobbying Disclosure Data Set. 
 
Note: This includes all House and Senate Hearings from the 104th Congress.  Hearing data from Policy Agendas Project, 
Congressional Hearings data, Groups Data from the Lobbying Disclosure Data Set. 
130 
Figure 5.4. Interest Group Participation in the Judiciary by Issue Area 
 
Note: Data from Collins and Soloweij (2007). 
 
Note: Data from Collins and Soloweij (2007). 
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Figure 5.5. Ratio of Groups Participating as Amicus Curiae to Registered Lobbyists 
 
 
Note: Amicus Data from Collins and Soloweij (2007), Congressional Groups Data from the Lobbying 
Disclosure Data Set, bills data from the Congressional Bills Project. 
 
 
Note: Amicus Data from Collins and Soloweij (2007), Congressional Groups Data from the Lobbying 
Disclosure Data Set, hearings data from the Policy Agendas Project. 
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Table 5.1. Policy Agendas Project Issue Areas 
 
 
  
 
 
Policy Agendas Code Issue Area 
1 Macroeconomics 
2 Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties 
3 Health 
4 Agriculture 
5 Labor, Immigration, and Employment 
6 Education 
7 Environment 
8 Energy 
10 Transportation 
12 Law, Crime, and Family  
13 Social Welfare 
14 Community Development and Housing 
15 Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 
16 Defense 
17 Space, Science, Technology, and Communications 
18 Foreign Trade 
19 International Affairs and Foreign Aid 
20 Government Operations 
21 Public Lands and Water Management 
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Table 5.2. Predictors of Interest Group Participation 
 
 I.  
Groups in 
Congress 
 II. 
Groups in 
Congress 
 III. 
Groups in  
Court 
 IV. 
Groups in 
Congress 
 Coefficient 
(SE) 
 Coefficient 
(SE) 
 Coefficient 
(SE) 
 Coefficient 
(SE) 
Bills 1.88 
(.70) 
***  --   --   2.13 
(.93) 
** 
Hearings --   5.08 
(3.81) 
*  --   --  
Cases --   --   16.53 
(1.39) 
***  -30.46 
(21.04) 
* 
Constant 347.58 
(278.85) 
  695.82 
(275.02) 
***  -2.61 
(9.94) 
  376.13 
(261.96) 
* 
F 7.18 ***  1.78 *  141.21 ***  2.66 ** 
r
2
 .31   .10   .89   .37  
n 18   18   18   18  
 
***Significant at p < .01 (one-tailed), **Significant at p < .05 (one-tailed), *Significant at p < .01 (one-tailed). 
 
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
…BUT ONLY JUDGMENT
 
This dissertation began, in many ways, where the American judiciary began: with the 
assumption that, without the purse or the sword, the judiciary remains “the least dangerous 
branch” of the American political system.  Without the ability to enforce or implement its 
decisions, traditional wisdom dictates, the courts’ power is necessarily limited.  The courts 
must depend on the legislative and executive branches to assure compliance with their 
decisions, and without cooperation from these actors, the judiciary’s ability to act as a 
policymaker is constrained. 
In the chapters that have preceded this one, however, I have shown that the judiciary 
has much broader ability to influence in the American political process—albeit in ways that 
are not always obvious to the casual observer—than much of the existing scholarship 
assumes.  This power exists in addition to whatever cooperation the courts can muster from 
the other branches.  It may not be evident in every issue area or case the courts consider.  
But, it is exercised in more sophisticated ways—through, for example, the way that particular 
judicial decisions affect the agendas and resource allocations of the media and interest 
groups. 
A Broader View of Judicial Power 
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 Much of the early research on law and the courts (scholarship that we might today 
call part of the public law tradition) found that the judiciary was an essential tool for securing 
social and political change, particularly among politically disadvantaged groups (Cortner 
1968).  These scholars (e.g. Vose 1955, 1957, 1959) drew on anecdotal evidence, particularly 
from the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund, to demonstrate that, without the 
courts, activists would have won precious few victories and secured very little policy change 
in the middle part of the twentieth century.  The groups, themselves, acknowledged the 
centrality of the courts to their goals, crafting test case litigation strategies on issues such as 
housing and educational segregation.  These litigation campaigns ultimately culminated in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) and Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), which paved the way for desegregation in the South by establishing legal 
precedent and inspiring grassroots activists. 
 The successes of the NAACP LDF and other groups interested in civil rights issues 
inspired activists affiliated with American Civil Liberties Union to found the Women’s 
Rights Project to engage in similar test case strategies to challenge discrimination in 
employment and other areas of public life.  Scholars (e.g. Cowan 1976, O’Connor 1980) 
have documented the role of the courts in changing the constitutional standard of review for 
gender-based claims (elevating these cases to an intermediate standard of review).  These 
scholars and others argue that, without judicial involvement, legal change would have been 
much slower, if not impossible. 
 As this evidence demonstrates, qualitative observers and public law scholars painted a 
relatively rosy picture of the judiciary’s power to use its judgments to create and inspire 
social change and progress.  The publication of Rosenberg’s (1991) Hollow Hope, however, 
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called many of these conclusions into question.  In this analysis, Rosenberg uses case studies 
of several policy issues, including civil rights, women’s rights, and abortion to show that 
judicial decisions alone cannot alter the course of public policy.  Rosenberg provides 
evidence that even in issue areas where the U.S. Supreme Court made a landmark decision, 
significant policy change occurred only after Congress and the executive branch began to 
focus on these issues.  In short, Rosenberg argues that the judiciary lacks the power to ensure 
compliance with its decisions.  Therefore, courts are a “hollow hope” for those individuals 
who seek to achieve social and political change. 
 More recent studies of compliance with judicial decisions in other policy areas 
provide an equally dismal impression of the judiciary’s ability to implement public policy 
(e.g. McGuire 2009).  Practically, too, examples of citizens and policymakers defying 
judicial rulings abound.  Citizens, for example, may not always be aware of (or choose to 
ignore) the dictates of the Court’s rulings.  Such is the case with school principals who 
continue to encourage prayer at public school events.  Similarly, legislators may choose to 
simply defy the dictates of the Court, such as those who advocated for the passage of a 
federal partial birth abortion ban, despite the Court’s declaration that similar state bans were 
unconstitutional. 
 This dissertation does not dispute the contention that the courts often require the 
cooperation of other actors in order fully implement their decrees.69  The systems of 
separation of powers and checks and balances crafted by the Framers require institutions 
seeking to create policy change to have willing allies in the process.  But, the judiciary’s 
range of allies is not limited—as the studies of Rosenberg and others might seem to 
                                                
69 Of course, this challenge is not unique to the judiciary.  One need only look at recent debates on healthcare 
reform to be reminded how difficult it is for the president to create policy change without the cooperation of 
Congress.  
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suggest—to solely the executive and legislative branches.  Instead, judiciary may seek and 
utilize alternative methods of political influence.  Among these are working with the media 
and interest groups to place and maintain new issues on the political agenda.   
This process may take a significant amount of time, as discussed in the abortion 
example in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  It may also be more effective in some issue areas 
than others.  Chapters 2 and 4, for example, demonstrate that cases that deal with 
constitutional issues—or where the courts act as what Baumgartner and Jones (1993) call 
policy venues—are much more likely to attract the attention of other policy actors.  But, 
given the appropriate circumstances, the judiciary can be a significant agenda setter (see 
Chapter 3).  Its decisions may also have significant consequences for the inputs and outputs 
of other branches of the federal government (see Chapter 5). 
 The source of this power is not one based in force or will, but rather judgment.  The 
very activity Hamilton believed would cripple the courts in the political system has, in fact, 
empowered them to become a more co-equal branch.  By deciding which cases to hear (in 
discretionary courts like the U.S. Supreme Court), and by issuing opinions on these matters, 
the courts assert themselves as agenda setters at both the grassroots and elite levels.70  
 One need only look at the Court’s recent campaign finance/First Amendment decision 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) to see this process at work.  The 
Court chose the Citizens United case (which, notably, was brought to the justices by an 
interest group) as one of the 75 or so cases it would consider during its 2009-2010 term.  This 
case was selected out of approximately 10,000 other cases.  Immediately, interest groups on 
both sides of the issue became more interested in the issue of campaign finance reform, 
                                                
70 Interestingly, as the power of quasi-institutional and non-institutional actors like the media and interest 
groups continues to grow within the political system, it would be little wonder if the judiciary was also more 
able to assert itself in the agenda-setting process and continue to increase its institutional power. 
138 
shifting their resources both within the judiciary and in the broader political system to file 
amicus curiae briefs.  Perhaps more importantly, after the Court handed down its decision, 
which effectively granted corporations many of the rights enjoyed by individuals, the media 
launched a still-ongoing discussion on the issue of campaign financing.  Until the Court’s 
decision, this was thought by many observers to be a relatively settled political issue, at least 
in the short run.  Now, these discussions (and outrage over the Court’s decision) have forced 
Congress to consider new policies in this issue area. 
Empirical Implications 
 This more sophisticated understanding of judicial power has a number of practical 
implications.  On one hand, the findings speak to the ability of the judiciary to control its 
own image and presentation, as well as the way the courts interact with actors such as the 
media and interest groups.  But, on the other hand, these findings also speak to the way that 
the courts’ judgments affect the broader political system and policymaking process. 
Within the Judiciary 
First, consider the judiciary’s control over its own image and agenda.  As Chapter 2 
demonstrates, judges play a role in shaping how the business of the courts is presented in the 
media. They do this in two key ways.  First, by deciding to decide cases concerning certain 
issue areas where the courts are more (or less) likely to influence public policy, a court can 
attract attention to a broader (or narrower) array of judicial decisions and garner more (or 
less) in-depth coverage of the issues they decide.  Alternately, judges can craft their decisions 
to conform to certain characteristics that make them more or less appealing to the media.  
These characteristics also affect both the breadth and the depth of the media’s coverage, and 
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are conditioned by the political environment in which the court operates.71 
 Further, as Chapter 4 shows, the characteristics of cases the U.S. Supreme Court 
decides to consider can influence interest groups’ lobbying activities before that body.  Even 
after controlling for other factors that shape interest group participation, significantly more 
briefs are filed in cases that allow interest groups to pursue their dual goals of influencing 
public policy and organizational maintenance.   This finding suggests that the Court’s docket 
composition may be extremely important in establishing and maintaining its institutional 
power, as well as its influence over the American policy making process.  By strategically 
considering cases that will attract attention from interest groups, the Court can affect whether 
issues appear on the political agenda by altering the amount of resources that are devoted to 
lobbying on these concerns. 
Beyond the Judiciary 
 The consequences of the judiciary’s judgments do not end at the marble courthouse 
stairs.  Instead, they extend to the broader political system and the courts’ interactions with 
other political institutions.  As Chapter 3 demonstrates, the types of cases the U.S. Supreme 
Court decides to decide affect the types of political issues the general public is exposed to 
through news coverage.  The Court’s ability to act as an agenda setter actually surpasses that 
of the president, which appears to be a more reactive institution.  The Court’s ability to set 
the agenda is particularly important in constitutional issue areas where the judiciary is more 
likely to act as a policy venue.  This assigns to the judiciary a much greater role as agenda 
setter than is typically assumed, both in the judicial politics literature and in the public policy 
literature. 
                                                
71 The current analysis, of course, was unable to look at the tone of these stories or precisely how the media 
presented the business of the courts.  This remains fodder for future studies, perhaps employing automated 
content analysis techniques. 
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Chapter 5, further, demonstrates that the composition of the Court’s docket affects 
how interest groups allocate their lobbying resources both within and across branches.  These 
effects may extend far beyond a given term.  This, in turn, affects not only the information 
received by the Court, but also the information received by the other branches of the federal 
government (in this case, the legislature).  It affects the attentiveness of policy monitoring by 
these groups, and alters the constituencies that policymakers feel the greatest pressure to 
please. 
This specialization creates a symbiotic relationship between interest groups and 
government that reinforces institutions’ positions as policy venues.  A group interested in a 
given issue strategically chooses to lobby a particular branch of government precisely 
because it is the most likely agent to create lasting long- and short-term policy change.    But, 
interest group lobbying in a particular branch of government also generates media attention 
and constituent awareness that further cements that branch’s control over a policy issue.   
This symbiosis is not an entirely new idea (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  But, the 
idea that such a relationship can occur in the judiciary as well as the legislature has received 
little attention.  Similarly neglected has been empirical evidence that there is interdependence 
(or at least a strategic decision) between groups’ decisions to participate in the legislature and 
groups’ decision to participate in the judiciary.   
Future Directions 
First and foremost, the findings of this dissertation should serve as a continued call-
to-arms for scholars interested in the judiciary to focus their attention on the role and power 
of courts as the third co-equal branch of American government, a branch that has gained 
tremendous power in the last two hundred years.   Studying the judiciary within the context 
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of its interactions with other institutional, non-institutional, and quasi-institutional policy 
actors paints a much fuller picture of the policymaking process.  It also more fully captures 
the strategic considerations that motivate the decisions of political actors.  
Studies that acknowledge courts’ interactions with other political actors have not been 
uncommon among positive political theorists.  They have, however, been less common 
among traditional quantitative and qualitative researchers.  In addition, many game-theoretic 
approaches to the judiciary in the political system have focused on the courts’ direct 
interactions with other political institutions.  But, as this dissertation suggests, courts’ 
influence on the political system as a whole may be more sophisticated.  More fully 
considering the interactions between courts and the media, interest groups, and other actors 
such as political parties (to name a few) is essential to understanding how issues emerge on 
public and governmental agendas. 
 In my view, the next step to more fully explaining the interactions between the 
judiciary and media outlets and/or interest groups is to better understand the decision making 
processes and salient concerns of each of the policy actors involved.  Anecdotal evidence, for 
example, tells us that the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court rely (at least occasionally) on 
interest groups to provide information on the consequences of decisions, educate them about 
the issues at hand, and gauge how a decision may affect the Court’s institutional prestige.   
Similarly, judges and justices appear to rely upon the media to communicate their decisions 
to the general public in plain language (e.g. Staton 2010).  Confirming these suspicions with 
the actual judges and justices making the decisions, especially in lower federal and state 
courts is essential to increasing confidence in the theory (but see Perry 1991). 
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 And, on the other hand, understanding how interest groups and the news media 
decide to allocate their limited resources will also enhance the richness of this and future 
explanations of the role and scope of judicial power.  How do editors allocate news space 
across institutions and issue areas?  How do reporters choose which cases to write about?  
Similarly, how and when do interest groups decide when and if to participate before the 
courts?  Is there usually long-term strategy involved, or are decisions made on a more ad hoc 
basis? 
 A wealth of evidence on questions such as these could be obtained by conducting 
interviews with individuals who work in the media and for interest groups.  Although this 
dissertation uses evidence solely from the print media, it would be useful to collect evidence 
from individuals who worked in print, broadcast, and electronic media to better understand 
these calculations.  Similarly, talking with representatives from a range of different interest 
groups with a range of different resources and demands would shed greater light on this 
decision calculus. 
 Another important dimension of judicial power not thoroughly discussed and 
analyzed in this dissertation is the scope of the second “face” of power (Bachrach and Baratz 
1962, 1963, 1970): negative agenda control.  Throughout this dissertation, I have alluded to 
the importance of having a discretionary docket and the great power that this gives many 
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, in keeping issues off of the agendas of the media 
and interest groups.  I have not, however, been able to empirically demonstrate the scope of 
this effect.  Upon completion of the coding of the Policy Agendas Project’s Certiorari Denied 
dataset (or through the construction of a similar data source),72 which would allow for 
                                                
72 The Certiorari Denied dataset is an additional piece of the Policy Agendas Project that is structured in the 
same way as the existing databases of executive, legislative, and judicial activity used here.  When completed, it 
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empirical analysis of the types of issues the Court does not choose to hear, I am hopeful that 
the second face of power may receive greater consideration.  Once such analyses are 
conducted, I expect that the subtle power of the judiciary to make policy and set the agenda 
through little more than its ability to make judgments will become even clearer. 
Conclusion 
 The American systems of checks and balances and separation of powers create a 
government where the political institutions are naturally, and perhaps, necessarily, enemies in 
the policymaking process.   Hamilton and the other Framers believed that this system would 
place the greatest limitations on the judiciary.  In the Framers’ conception, the courts would 
act as neutral arbiters of the law above the fray of politics.  Though the judiciary could make 
judgments, it would lack the force or will to assure that these decisions were implemented or 
enforced.  
 What the Framers did not imagine, however, was that the judiciary might find friends 
in the policymaking process outside the boundaries of traditional political institutions.  
Among these are the media and interest groups. By simply making judgments about whether 
to hear particular types of cases (and then issuing decisions on these matters), the courts can 
alter the priorities of these quasi-institutional actors.  In so doing, judges and justices can 
increase (or decrease) the salience of particular political issues.  They change alter groups’ 
resource allocations and the information that interest groups provide government.  And, in so 
doing, they can affect the efforts of other branches to undertake similar activities.  
                                                                                                                                                  
will look at cases the Court chose not to hear, coding them using the same nineteen major topic codes as the 
other databases.  It will be the first comprehensive, longitudinal examination of the cases the Court does not 
consider.  The development of this database will, obviously, allow for a wide range of examinations of a 
significant, but under-analyzed (and under-understood), stage of the judicial process.  
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 If the courts remain, as Hamilton stated, “the least dangerous branch,” it is only 
because the other branches, too, have become infinitely more powerful over the last 225 
years.  More likely, however, it is time to dismiss the notion that the courts must be able to 
independently implement or enforce their decisions in order to exercise political influence.   
An important element of the judiciary’s modern institutional power, it seems, lies in a much 
more innocuous place: the ability to make judgments. 
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